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Abstract
Being emotionally aroused often involves making different choices than
one’s ex-ante preferences. In this research project, we experimentally study
the effect of incidental emotions induced through movies on individuals’
social preferences. We design an experiment which consists of a triadic
design Trust Game to identify the subjects’ trusting and positive reciprocal
preferences, a triadic design Ultimatum Game to identify their negative
reciprocal preferences and the Dictator Game to identify their altruistic
preferences. Our results suggest that there exists an impact of emotions
on the social preferences. Firstly, sad people are less motivated by the
fear of rejection than happy people and than people in a neutral mood.
Secondly, sad people behave more altruistically than people in a neutral
mood. Finally, we find evidence to support that happy people trust less than
people in a neutral mood. Results provide evidence against the hypothesis
that emotions do not systematically affect the decisions that concern other
people.
Keywords: Experimental Economics, Decision Making, Social Preference,
Emotion.
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DUYGULARIN KARAR VERME ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ: DENEYSEL KANIT
Ceren Bengü Çıbık
Ekonomi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2017
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Özgür KIBRIS
Özet
Duygusal olarak uyarılmış olmak genellikle kişinin ön görülen tercihlerinden farklı
seçimler yapmasına neden olur. Bu araştırma projesinde, ﬁlm klipleri aracılığıyla
uyarılmış duyguların, kişinin sosyal tercihleri üzerindeki etkisini deneysel olarak
incelemekteyiz. Tasarladığımız deneyimiz güven ve pozitif karşılık tercihlerini be-
lirleyen üçlü Güven Oyunu’ndan, negatif karşılık tercihlerini belirleyen üçlü ül-
timatom Oyunu’ndan ve özgecil tercihleri belirleyen Diktatör Oyunu’ndan oluş-
maktadır. Deneyden elde ettiğimiz sonuçlar duyguların sosyal tercihler üzerinde
etkisi olduğunu göstermektedir. İlk bulgumuz, üzgün kişilerin duygu durumu nötr
olan kişilere ve mutlu kişilere göre daha az reddedilme korkusuyla hareket ettiğini
göstermektedir. İkinci olarak, üzgün kişilerin duygu durumu nötr olan kişilere göre
daha çok özgecil davrandığını görmekteyiz. Son bulgumuz ise, mutlu insanların
duygu durumu nötr olan kişilere göre tanımadıkları kişilere karşı daha az güven
duyduğunu gösteren kanıtlar sunmaktadır. Sonuçlarımız duyguların diğer kişileri
ilgilendiren kararlar üzerinde sistematik bir etkisi olmadığını savunan hipotezlere
karşı kanıt sunmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Deneysel Ekonomi, Karar Verme, Sosyal Tercih, Duygu.
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1 Introduction
In the neoclassical model of economic behaviour, individuals process the available
information appropriately and make choices to maximize their utilities. It is called
rationality axiom and this could be - and often has been - considered as being self-
interested by economists. The model assumes that the framing of the information
does not aﬀect their preferences. In laboratory settings, this assumption is proved
to be inadequate to explain behaviour during decision making (Simon, 1982; Kah-
neman, 2003). As deeper studies have shown, individuals show risk preference
reversal under diﬀerent frames and reference points (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979),
exhibit inconsistent time preferences (Thaler, 1981), a pattern of behaviour which
represents a concern for other people (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Fehr & Gachter,
2000) and misestimation of their skills and future states (Read & van Leeuven,
1998; Gilbert et al., 1998). There are systematic inconsistencies in the application
of self-regarding preferences.
This research project explores the eﬀect of emotions on social preferences to
achieve a better understanding of individuals’ decision making. We design an
experiment that consists of 2 emotion treatments, (the Happy treatment and the
Sad treatment) and the control group (the Neutral treatment). We select these
treatments based on Russel (1980). Happiness and sadness are corresponding
emotional states that have positive and negative valence, respectively. To awaken
the participants’ emotions, we show them short excerpts from three movies which
take nine minutes in total. In the Sad treatment, we chose movies which are
considered as upsetting, or painful. In the Happy treatment, we chose movies
1
which are considered as pleasing or cheerful. To categorize movies as sad or happy,
we rely on the results of Schaefer et al. (2010). They conducted a study to reveal
the emotional eﬀectiveness of movie clips and to provide the largest data set for
the researchers. In order to achieve these goals, seven emotion categories which
contains amusement and sadness were constructed and for each emotion, ten movie
scenes that have acquired the highest rate of citation by ﬁfty ﬁlm experts were
selected. Then, participants watched and assessed the chosen ﬁlm clips with three
self-report measures: the Diﬀerential Emotional Scale, the PANAS scales and a
scale of subjective emotional arousal. We chose the movie clips from their data
set which have the highest arousal score, the highest positive aﬀect score and the
highest amusement score for the Happy treatment and have the highest arousal
score, the highest negative aﬀect score and the highest sadness score for the Sad
treatment. In Table 1, the list of movie clips and the description of the scenes
are shown. According to Gilet (2008), Westerman, Spies, Stahl and Hesse (1996),
and Schaefer et al. (2010), showing short movie clips is the most eﬃcient way to
activate one’s emotions. In addition, the nature of the movies provides one with
the most optimal ways to simulate real life conditions in a laboratory (Schaefer et
al., 2010).
In the second part of the experiment after subjects watched the movie clips, we
give 13 tasks to elicit their social preferences. Trust, positive reciprocity, inequality
aversion, negative reciprocity and altruism are considered as the social preferences.
To elicit these preferences we use a triadic design Trust Game, a triadic design
Ultimatum Game and the Dictator Game. There are two possible orders that
subjects could play these games. In order 1, the ﬁrst game is a triadic design
Trust Game, then the second is a triadic design Ultimatum Game and the last one
is a Dictator Game. In order 2, the ﬁrst game is a triadic design Ultimatum Game,
the second is a triadic design Trust Game and the last is a Dictator Game. The
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order in which subjects play these games are decided before the sessions starts.
In Section 4, We also perform an analysis of the Trust and the Ultimatum Game
on the ﬁrst round data which only includes the choices of subjects who play the
respective game as a ﬁrst game.
The triadic experimental design includes control games that discriminate among
actions with alternative motivations. A triadic Design Trust Game consists of a
Trust Game and two Dictator Games ( the Transfer Control and the Return Con-
trol Games). A triadic design Ultimatum Game consists of an Ultimatum Game
and two control games. One of them is a Dictator Game which we call the Oﬀer
Control Game and the other one is the Accept Control Game which is a modiﬁed
version of the Ultimatum Game. The methods that shows how to analyse these
games are explained in more detailed in Section 3.
In Table 2, experimental measures for each preference is represented. Using
the same elicitation methods mentioned above, the diﬀerence between two treat-
ment groups and the control group are analysed.
In the last part of our experiment, in order to be sure about the eﬃciency of
mood induction technique throughout the movies on our subject pool, participants
asses the movies with two self-report measures: a scale of subjective emotional
arousal and the Diﬀerent Emotional Scale (DES; Izard et. al, 1974). In addition,
we give participants a questionnaire to obtain demographic information about
them. Demographic questionnaire, emotional measure questions, experimental
instruction and additional information about experimental procedure can be found
in Appendix. To sum up: First of all, subjects watch movie clips. Then, they
answer total of 9 questions about their social preferences. Finally, they ﬁll in the
emotional arousal survey and the demographic survey.
Our research project is important for three main reasons. First of all, we present
experimental evidence on the eﬀect of emotions on the subjects’ behaviour. This
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evidence would provide a useful tool for predicting the actions of economic agents.
Secondly, in order to incorporate emotions into economic theory, one needs to know
the systematic changes that results from people’s emotional state. As Loewenstein
(2000) suggested, a state-dependent utility function can be used to adapt emotions
in the economic theory. This fuction can incorporate the broader goals of deliber-
ative system and the aﬀective system driven by emotions and motivational states
(Loewenstein et al., 2015). They gave an example to describe how the dual-process
they suggested can be applied to social preferences speciﬁcally for altruism. They
suggested that the deliberative system has a concern for others which is resulted
from the ethical and moral rules while the aﬀective system is driven toward any-
thing between pure self-interest and extreme altruism depending on the degree of
sympathy - his motivational state- and his emotional state. Therefore, the person
will choose an option that is between the deliberative optimum and the aﬀective
optimum. However, without knowing what emotions’ exact eﬀects are, it does not
worth considering. Therefore, we provide experimental evidence to incorporate
emotions into economic theory by showing how diﬀerent emotions shift the sub-
jects’ behaviour in an experimental setting. Finally, we analyse the emotions that
are exogenous to interaction between two players. The former (Bosman and van
Winden, 2002; Bosman and Riedl, 2003; Charness and Grosskopf, 2001) analyze
the eﬀect of emotions that result from the interaction of players in a given game.
We are the ﬁrst in the literature who use the mood induction technique for happy
and sad emotions in triadic design experiments to examine their eﬀects on a wide
range of social preferences.
Then, we hypothesized our claims based on the existing literature that we
mention in Section 2:
Hypothesis 1.1. Sad people trust more than people in a neutral mood.
Hypothesis 1.2. Sad people trust more than happy people.
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Hypothesis 1.3. Happy people trust less than people in a neutral mood.
Hypothesis 2.1. Sad people positively reciprocate more than people in a neutral
mood.
Hypothesis 2.2. Sad people positively reciprocate more than happy people.
Hypothesis 2.3. Happy people positively reciprocate less than people in a neutral
mood.
Hypothesis 3.1. Sad people are motivated less by the fear of rejection than
people in a neutral mood.
Hypothesis 3.2. Sad people are motivated less by the fear of rejection than
happy people.
Hypothesis 3.3. Happy people are motivated less by the fear of rejection than
people in a neutral mood.
Hypothesis 4.1. Sad people negatively reciprocate less than people in a neutral
mood.
Hypothesis 4.2. Sad people negatively reciprocate less than happy people.
Hypothesis 4.3. Happy people negatively reciprocate more than people in a
neutral mood.
Hypothesis 5.1. Sad people behave more altruistically than people in a neutral
mood.
Hypothesis 5.2. Sad people behave more altruistically than happy people.
Hypothesis 5.3. Happy people behave less altruistically than people in a neutral
mood.
5
Hypothesis 6.1. Sad people are more inequality-averse than people in a neutral
mood.
Hypothesis 6.2. Sad people are more inequality-averse than happy people.
Hypothesis 6.3. Happy people are less inequality-averse than people in a neutral
mood.
We ﬁnd an interaction between one’s current emotional state and his/her be-
haviour. Social preferences are not independent of emotions. Speciﬁcally, we
support Hypothesis 3.1 and Hypothesis 3.2 which state that sad people are less
motivated by the fear of rejection than happy people and than people in a neu-
tral mood. We also support Hypothesis 5.1 which states that sad people behave
more altruistically than people in a neutral mood. In addition, we ﬁnd evidence
to support Hypothesis 1.3 which states that happy people trust less than people
in a neutral mood when we only consider the ﬁrst round data.
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 present the related
literature. Section 3 describes our experimental design and procedure in detail.
Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
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Table 1: List of Movie Clips
Treatment Movie Description
Blue (1) A person passes a piece of aluminum foil
through the window of a car.
Neutral
Tr.
Blue (2) A man clears out the drawers of his desk; a
woman arrives walking in an alley.
The Lover Marguerite gets into a car, and the car
starts to ride.
There is something
about Mary (1)
Ted ﬁghts with a dog.
Happy
Tr.
When Harry met Sally Sally simulates an orgasm in a restaurant.
There is something
about Mary (2)
Mary takes sperm from Ted’s hair
mistaking it for hair gel.
Dead Man Walking The main character is put to death by
lethal injection.
Sad Tr. Life is Beatiful The main character is killed after he saw his
son.
Schindler’s List Dead bodies are being carried away in a
concentration camp.
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2 Related Literature
Integral and incidental emotions have been distinguished by several authors (e.g.Cohen,
Pham & Andrade, 2008; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Integral emotions result
from the choice that depends on people’s actions while incidental emotions’ sources
are not connected to the decision at hand. The situation where people experience
regret when the outcome of a gamble is less than their reference point is given as
an example of integral emotions by Hoezl and Loewenstein (2005). Regret depends
on the action taken by the subject. On the other hand, Johnson and Tversky found
that people who had a pleasant experience such as having free lunch judge political
slogans more positively than people who had a negative experience (1983). These
are incidental emotions which arouse independent of the subjects’ own actions
or choices. Since we use exogenous mood induction process in this research, we
always refer incidental emotions.
In the standard rational choice model that is widely used in economic theory,
the eﬀect of emotions is not considered as a factor that could alter individuals’
choices. According to the large literature on emotion in psychology, emotions play
an important role in the decision making process and diﬀerent emotions have dif-
ferent eﬀects on it. Even minor changes in the environment that could aﬀect the
emotional state of an individual seems to alter their behaviour. In his experiment,
Rind (1996) found that subjects tip more at the restaurant if the weather is sunnier.
Schwarz and Clore (1983) found that subjects’ overall happiness level is higher if
the weather is sunnier. Another example comes from a ﬁeld experiment. Saunders
(1993) concluded that the changes in one’s emotional state which is resulted from
the weather have an eﬀect on US stock returns. If the cloud cover is higher in
New York, aggregate US stock returns are lower. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003)
generalized Saunders’ ﬁnding to 26 cities which are from 26 diﬀerent countries.
They suggest that there is a negative relationship between cloud cover and aggre-
8
gate stock returns in 18 of the cities. Not only weather but also the outcome of
international soccer matches aﬀects the stock returns. Edmans, Garcia and Norli
(2007) concluded that for the losing country daily returns are signiﬁcantly lowered
by 0.21 percent compared to a day with no match. The eﬀect of emotions is not
bounded by ﬁnancial outcomes. Simonsohn (2010) found that students who visit
prestigious universities on higher cloud cover days are signiﬁcantly more likely to
enroll because they are more prone to focus on academic attributes than social at-
tributes on days with more cloud cover. The result of another experiment by Ariely
and Loewenstein (2006) suggests that subjects in sexually aroused emotional state
as a treatment are more willing to engage in possible date rape behaviour.
In addition, neuroscientists provide valuable scientiﬁc evidence which shows
the relation between brain parts which regulate emotions and are responsible for
decision making. One of the most important evidence comes from the study of
Bechara et al. (2000) on emotionally impaired patients. These people have perma-
nent injuries to the ventromedial prefrontol cortex (vmPFC) which is responsible
of integrating emotion and cognition. People are not perfectly able to feel emotion
and the optimality of their decisions. In their study, patients who have impair-
ments on vmPFC repeatedly select a riskier ﬁnancial option over a safer one in
a gambling task because they are not able to experience the emotional signals
which help decision makers to have a fear of high risk. This kind of studies have
encouraged especially economists to study further on emotions and their role in
the decision making process.
2.1 Elicitation of Social Preferences
The standard rational choice model often interpreted as that individuals behave
only with respect to self-interests, their own payoﬀs. Cox (2007) deﬁnes “eco-
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nomic man” or “self-regarding preferences” as preferences which are characterized
by monotonic utility with indiﬀerence about others’ material payoﬀs but positively
aﬀected for one’s own material payoﬀs. However, wide range of laboratory exper-
iments have weaken this assumption. In addition to pure self-interest, individuals
are also aﬀected by other people’s payoﬀs negatively or positively, an event called
as other-regarding preferences. Cox, Sadiraj K., and Sadiraj V. (2002) deﬁne
other-regarding preferences as "preferences over the absolute and relative amount
of another individual’s money payoﬀ, in addition to one’s own money payoﬀ."
Other-regarding preference may or may not be aﬀected by the history between the
interacting parties. People may exhibit positive reciprocal behaviour to another
person in return to a good interaction with her in the past even though this act
does not maximize their own utility. However, when choices of individuals are not
a result of what action the other party made, there also exists unconditional other-
regarding preferences on other parties’ behaviour like altruism, inequality-aversion.
For example, in Forsythe et al. (1994)’s experiment with Dictator Game, a sub-
ject is endowed with $10 and asked to allocate none or a part of his endowment
to an anonymous partner. Although pure self-interest suggests that the dictator
should not allocate any positive amount to the other player, Forsythe et al. (1994)
ﬁnd that 60% of the participants transfer a positive amount. This result has been
supported by a lot of experimental evidence. This result suggests that people
might not act only with respect to their self-interest. Other social factors such as
revenge, trust, guilt, fairness or reciprocity could aﬀect their decisions, too.
The method that is used to elicit these preferences is one of the most important
aspects of designing an experiment. If the experimental design is not as successful
as to control the possible motives behind subjects’ behaviour, it could even alter
the results of the experiments. In this section, we introduce the methods that are
widely used in Experimental Economics to elicit social preferences: trust, altruism,
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positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity.
2.1.1 Trust
Trust is a belief that one agent has about another. A trusting action is one that
creates the possibility of mutual beneﬁt and the risk of loss of one’s own utility
if the other person defects (Cox, 2004). Investment games (or Trust Games)
devised by Berg et al. (1995) are the ﬁrst and one of the most widespread ways
to elicit trust in the experimental economics. In the investment game, subjects
are randomly placed as a ﬁrst mover and second mover roles. Both players are
endowed with A amount of money. The ﬁrst mover chooses to allocate a portion
or none of his endowment to the second mover. The amount given, x, is multiplied
by k where k > 1,and transferred to the second mover’s endowment. Then, the
second mover chooses to allocate a portion or none of his total endowment which
equals to A + kx. The allocated amount, y, is transferred to the ﬁrst mover. At
the end of the game, the ﬁrst mover is left with A − x + y where the second mover
is left with A + kx − y. Becker et al.(1995) employed the investment game to elicit
trust with two diﬀerent k values, k = 2 and k = 3. In his version, both players are
assigned to both roles, the ﬁrst player and the second player. The average amount
sent as a ﬁrst mover in two versions is used as subject’s willingness to trust a
stranger. If ﬁrst movers trust in positive reciprocity in the Investment Game, they
might achieve outcomes that are Pareto superior to the prediction of Nash for the
self-regarding preferences that is to pass zero amount since the economic man will
return zero amount in the second stage. Berg et al. (1995) found that 55 out of
60 ﬁrst players send a positive amount to the second players.
However, a ﬁrst player in the Investment Game may send at least some money
because either she/he trusts that the second mover will return some money, or,
she/he has an unconditional other-regarding preference as altruism. The triadic
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experimental design makes it possible to discriminate between altruism and trust.
For example, Cox (2001) used a triadic design Trust Game. In his design, the
Trust Game is same as in Berg et al. (1995): First players can transfer any
amount between zero and $10 while the second players can return any amount
between zero and three times the amount of transfer they received. It is called
Treatment A. Treatment B is a dictator game in which only ﬁrst movers have a
decision to make. They decide how much money to transfer to the second movers
while second movers cannot return any amount back. When he compared the
Treatment B with the Trust Game, he found that the ﬁrst players’ behaviour in
the Trust Game is motivated by trust (Cox, 2001).
Cox and Deck (2006) also use a Trust Game and two dictator control games
to discriminate among possible motives. Unlikely to Cox (2001), they provided
limited action spaces for the players. In their version of triadic design Trust game,
ﬁrst player either chooses “Exit” or “Engage”. If she chooses Exit, then player 1
and player 2 end up with 5 liras . If ﬁrst player chooses to Engage, then second
player either chooses to “Cooperate” or “Defect”. If he chooses to Cooperate,
player 1 and player 2 end up with 7.5 liras and 12.5 liras , respectively. If he
selects to Defect, then player 1 and player 2 end up with 0 lira and 20 liras ,
respectively. Control 1 is a Dictator Game in which the ﬁrst player decides either
to Exit or Engage. If she exits, both of them end up with 5 liras . The second
player does not have a choice to make. By comparing the results of Control 1 and
the Trust Game, they found that the ﬁrst movers’ behaviour is characterized by
trust in the Trust Game (Cox & Deck, 2006).
2.1.2 Altruism
A person is altruistic if his utility increases with the increase in other people’s
utility. Dictator Game is generally assessed to measure a subject’s preference of
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altruism. In Becker et al.’s (2016) study, subjects need to divide a portion or none of
his endowment to a charitable organization. The average amount donated among
subjects gives the measure of altruistic motives (Becker et al., 2016). Cox (2001)
and Cox & Deck (2006) report that high proportion of the oﬀers in the dictator
control games are non-zero. These results might be explained by the study of Dunn
et al. (2008). It suggests that only with helping others and giving to others with no
expectation, people gain happiness. Andreoni and Miller (2002) use the Dictator
Game with various initial endowments to elicit altruistic preferences. They found
that 30% of the subjects transfer an amount which equalizes the payoﬀs.
2.1.3 Positive Reciprocity
Positive reciprocity is a motivation to respond generous or helpful actions of the
other person by generous or helpful actions (Cox, 2004). Cox and Deck (2005),
describe positive reciprocity as ”...a motivation to adopt a generous action that
beneﬁts someone else because that person’s intentional behaviour was perceived
to be beneﬁcial to oneself within the decision context of the experiment”. One way
to measure is the Dictator Game in which a ﬁrst player is asked to allocate his
endowment, X, between himself and the second player. The allocation oﬀered will
be their respective payoﬀs. Ozbay and Drazen (2016) modiﬁed the Dictator Game
to analyse candidate’s reciprocity towards voters with spatial model of voting
(Down,1957). They compared the policy implemented by elected or appointed
leaders. If the leader does not implement his type as a policy, then his action is
considered as non-selﬁsh behaviour. The amount he moves from his type to the
voter’s type gives the candidate’s preference measure of positive reciprocity. They
found that in the Appointment treatment, 26.25% of the leaders chose a policy
diﬀerent than their types while in the Election treatment 40% of the leaders chose
a policy diﬀerent than their types. This diﬀerence between two treatments is
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statistically signiﬁcant according to the Mann-Whitney test. In addition, elected
leaders move more toward the voter when the voter chooses the further candidate
with an expectation of positive reciprocity than both when the voter chooses the
closer candidate and than appointed leaders.
Kirchsteiger, Rigotti and Rustichini (2006) designed a gift-exchange game to
investigate the eﬀect of mood on behaviour. In this game, the ﬁrst mover has an
initial endowment and can send a part or none of his endowment to the second
player. The second mover receives the transfer and decides to an eﬀort level.
Higher level of eﬀort comes with a higher cost for the second player but higher
increase in the ﬁrst mover’s payoﬀ. They found that second movers who were in
a good mood treatment reciprocate less than second movers who were in a bad
mood treatment. On the other hand, these same subjects are more generous to
others when they are assigned as ﬁrst movers (Kirchsteiger, Rigotti & Rustichini,
2006).
Another way to elicit positive reciprocity is the Investment Game (Berg et al.,
1995) which is deﬁned in Section 2.1.1. The average amount sent by the second
mover is used as subject’s preference measure of positive reciprocity. They found
that the average amount returned by the second players is higher than the average
amount sent by the ﬁrst players (Berg et al., 1995). Kausel and Connolly (2014)
examined people’s expectations about the eﬀect of emotions on others’ reciprocity
behaviour and whether these expectations shape their own behaviour by employing
the Investment Game. They found that when proposers are informed about their
partner’s emotional state - angry, guilty or grateful -, they acted consistently with
their beliefs about how these emotions aﬀect one’s behaviour. Angry responders’
actual behaviour signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the expected behaviour (Kausel & Con-
nolly, 2014). Capra (2004) found that subjects who experience negative emotions
(e.g. anger) reciprocate more than subjects who experience positive emotions in
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the Trust Game.
However, a second mover in the Trust Game returns a positive amount to the
ﬁrst player who sent at least some amount since either she/he has an altruistic or
inequality-averse preference, or she/he positively reciprocates the trusting action.
To test for quantitative eﬀects of these motives, the triadic design Investment Game
which incorporates dictator control games are used. This design consists of one
Trust Game and 2 control games. For example, Cox (2001) used a triadic design
Trust Game. In his design, the Trust Game is same as in Berg et al. (1995): First
players can transfer any amount between zero and $10 while the second players
can return any amount between zero and three times the amount of transfer they
received. It is called Treatment A. Treatment C is a dictator game in which only
second movers have a decision to make. At the beginning of this treatment, ﬁrst
players are endowed with an residual amount of money after they made a transfer
in the Trust Game. Second movers are endowed with $10 plus the three times
amount of transfer they received in the Trust Game. After second movers are
informed about his and his partner’s endowments, they transfer a part or none of
their endowments to the ﬁrst players. When he compared the Treatment C with
the Trust Game, he found that the second players’ behaviour in the Trust Game
is motivated by positive reciprocity (Cox, 2001).
Cox and Deck (2006) also used a Trust Game and two dictator control games
to discriminate among possible motives. Unlikely to Cox (2001), he limited the
action space for the players. In his version of the triadic design Trust game, ﬁrst
player either chooses “Exit” or “Engage”. If she chooses Exit, then player 1 and
player 2 end up with 5 liras . If ﬁrst player chooses to Engage, then second
player either chooses to “Cooperate” or “Defect”. If he chooses to Cooperate,
player 1 and player 2 end up with 7.5 liras and 12.5 liras , respectively. If he
selects to Defect, then player 1 and player 2 end up with 0 lira and 20 liras
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, respectively. Control 2 is a Dictator Game in which player 2 decides to either
cooperate or defect. If he cooperates, he will get 12.5 liras and the other player
will get 7.5 liras . If he defects, he will get 20 liras and the other player will
get nothing. By comparing the results of the dictator game and the Trust Game,
the second movers’ behaviour is not characterized by the positive reciprocity in
the Trust Game.
2.1.4 Negative Reciprocity
Fehr and Gachter (2000) deﬁne negative reciprocity as that in response to hostile
actions, people are frequently much more nasty and even brutal than predicted by
the self-interested model. According to Cox and Deck (2005), negative reciprocity
is "...a motivation to adopt a costly action that harms someone else because that
person’s intentional behaviour was perceived to be harmful to oneself within the
decision context of the experiment. Hence, in a given situation an action that
would otherwise not be taken is considered reciprocal if it is undertaken in re-
sponse to the action of another." One of most widespread ways to elicit negative
reciprocity is using the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Falk et al., 2005; Fehr & Gachter,
2000). The unilateral defection of a player can be punished by the other player
but it has a cost. Becker et al. (2016) introduce the Prisoner’s Dilemma with
punishment stage to measure negative reciprocity as follows: Both players have
an option to participate or not to participate to a project. The payoﬀs from both
players’ participation are (480,480) and from both players’ deviation are (300,300).
Unilateral deviation of the ﬁrst player and unilateral deviation of the second player
leads to payoﬀs of (540,240) and (240,540) respectively. Before the game is played,
each subject indicates that how much money from his own endowment he would
invest into the punishment of the other player’s unilateral deviation which will
decrease opponent’s payoﬀ by k times of the amount invested (where k > 1). In
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this scenario, the amount invested into costly punishment gives the measure of
subjects’ preferences of negative reciprocity.
Abbink et al. introduced the Moonlighting game. In this game, both players
start with 12 talers. Player 1 can take money from or transfer money to player
2 who can either return money or punish player 1 (2000). Each taller passed by
player 1 is multiplied by three and added into player 2’s endowment. On the other
hand, if player 2 wants to punish, each taller spent to punish by player 2 decreases
player 1’s payoﬀs by three times. This design allows to study both positive and
negative reciprocity in one game. They found that negative reciprocity is much
more prominent than positive reciprocity. It means that hostile actions are more
widely punished than good actions are rewarded (Abbink et al., 2000).
Another method is Ultimatum Game (Guth et al., 1982) in which one of the
subject is assigned into a role of a proposer and the other is a responder. The
proposer is endowed with X amount of money which in turn is allocated between
himself and the responder with respect to the proposer’s choice. The responder
has two options; accept or reject the oﬀer. If he accepts, then their payoﬀ will
be the allocation that is oﬀered by the proposer. If he rejects, both will end up
with zero payoﬀ. The responder’s minimum acceptable amount of money gives
his preference of negative reciprocity. Higher the minimum acceptable oﬀer higher
the rejection probability (Becker et al.,2016). While the unique sub-game perfect
equilibrium of this game is that the proposer gets the whole pie assuming that both
players are self-interested, the experimental results are in contrast. On average,
proposers oﬀer about 40% of the pie to the second players while they reject the
oﬀers about 15-20% of the time ( Levin, 2006). A lot of researchers showed that
ﬁrst movers in the Ultimatum Game oﬀer equal splits under various conditions
(Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982; Hoﬀman and Spitzer, 1985; Hoﬀman,
McCabe, Shachat, and Smith, 1994; and Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998).
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However, the proposer may oﬀer generously in the Ultimatum Game because
either he/she is afraid of rejection or has altruistic preferences. Furthermore, the
responder may reject the oﬀer because either he/she negatively reciprocates the
bad oﬀer or has inequality-averse or altruistic preferences. The triadic experi-
mental design makes it possible to discriminate between the implications of other-
regarding preferences and fear, or negative reciprocity. For example, Cox and Deck
(2006) use Punishment mini-ultimatum game and two dictator control games to
discriminate among possible motives. In the Punishment mini-ultimatum game,
ﬁrst player either chooses “Take” or “Share”. If she chooses Take, then second
player either chooses “Tolerate” or “Punish”. If he selects to Tolerate, then ﬁrst
player and second player end up with 8 and 2 dollars, respectively. If he selects
to Punish, both end up with zero payoﬀs. If ﬁrst player chooses to Share, then
second player either chooses to “Accept” or “Reject”. If he chooses to Accept, they
both end up with 5 dollars. If he selects to Reject, then both get nothing. Control
1 is a Dictator Game in which the ﬁrst player decides either to Take or Share. If
she takes the oﬀer, mover 1 and mover 2 end up with 8 and 2 dollars, respectively.
The second player does not have a choice to make. Control 2 is a variation of the
Punishment mini-ultimatum game in which nature decides which option player
1 will choose with an equal probability. Then, second player decides to take or
share and accept or reject. By comparing the results of dictator games and the
Punishment mini-ultimatum game, they found that the ﬁrst movers’ behaviour is
not characterized by the fear of rejection and the second movers’ behaviour in the
Punishment mini-ultimatum game is not characterized by the negative reciprocity.
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3 Experimental Design and Procedure
Our experiment was conducted at Sabancı University, Turkey in June, 2017. All
participants were students who received 5 liras as a show up fee plus a payoﬀ de-
termined by random selection of one of the games. The experiment is computerized
via Z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments (Fischbacher,
2007). We have 3 treatment groups: the Neutral treatment, the Happy treatment,
the Sad Treatment. We conducted 3 sessions for the Neutral treatment, 5 sessions
for the Happy treatment and 5 sessions for the Sad treatment. Each subject par-
ticipated once, in one game, and in only one session. Subjects were free to sign up
any sessions. To minimize personal interaction between the researchers and the
subjects, we use double blind procedure in which the experimenter do not know
subjects’ identity and subjects do not know their partners’ identity. The only per-
son who knows the decision of a speciﬁc individual is the individual herself. We
give random identiﬁcation codes to the subjects and made their payments with
these codes in a closed envelope. Subjects only enter the identiﬁcation codes to
the computer. We use random payment schemes on decisions. In each session, we
randomly selected one decision task to make payment. One of the thirteen deci-
sions the subjects made during the experiment is randomly drawn and payment is
done with respect to the chosen decision task. Each session took 30 minutes and
each subject received on average 25 liras.
The experiment consists of three parts. In the ﬁrst part, participants watch
three movie clips which takes about nine minutes in total. In Table 1, the list of
movie clips are shown. In the second part of the experiment, the triadic design
experiments and the Dictator Game are used to elicit subjects’ social preferences:
trust, positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity and altruism. It consists of one
triadic-design Trust Game, one triadic-design Ultimatum Game and a Dictator
Game. These games are explained below in more detail. Participants played
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these game in two possible orders: a triadic-design Trust Game, a triadic-design
Ultimatum Game, the Dictator Game or a triadic-design Ultimatum Game, a
triadic-design Trust Game, the Dictator Game. The order is decided before the
experiment started. Except the Dictator Game, each game is played twice with
reversed roles. In the third part, two self-report measures: subjective emotional
arousal and the DES (Izard et al., 1974) are employed to asses the eﬀectiveness
of the movie clips on our participants’ emotional states. Subjects are asked to
answer the following questions for each of the movie clips they watched. “Please
rate the following statement by using a 7-point scale: While I was watching the
ﬁlm ...... (1)=I felt no emotions at all to (7)= I felt very intense emotions.”.
This measure is named as self − reported emotional arousal in Schaefer et al.
(2010). In the DES (Izard et al., 1974), participants used again a 7-point scale
(1“not at all”, 7“very intense”) to rate the group of adjectives as follows “For each
group of adjectives below, please rate the extent to which you felt each state as
you were watching the ﬁlm clip: (1) interested, concentrated, alert; (2) joyful,
happy, amused; (3) sad, downhearted, blue; (4) angry, irritated, mad; (5) fearful,
scared, afraid; (6) anxious, tense, nervous; (7) disgusted, turned oﬀ, repulsed; (8)
disdainful, scornful, contemptuous; (9) surprised, amazed, astonished; (10) warm
hearted, gleeful, elated.” After mood induction survey, participants are asked to
answer 12 demographic questions. Demographic questionnaire, mood induction
survey and experimental instruction can be found in Appendix A.
3.1 The Triadic Design Trust Game
It consists of a Trust Game and 2 control games. Subjects are randomly assigned
to either a ﬁrst mover role or a second mover role. Both ﬁrst players and second
players play the Trust Game. Then, ﬁrst players play the Transfer Control Game
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while second players play the Return Control Game. After ﬁrst two decisions,
subjects’ role as ﬁrst mover or second mover is reversed and they are rematched
randomly. Then, they are asked to play the same game again with reversed roles.
3.1.1 The Trust Game
In the Trust Game, subjects are endowed with 10 liras and randomly assigned to
either ﬁrst mover role or second mover role. First movers are randomly matched
with second movers in a way that they do not know their opponents. The ﬁrst
mover chooses to allocate a portion or none of his endowment to the second mover.
The amount given, sT , is multiplied by 3 and transferred to the second mover’s
endowment. Then, the second mover chooses to allocate a portion or none of
his total endowment which is equal to 10 + 3sT . The allocated amount, rT , is
transferred to the ﬁrst mover. At the end of the game, the ﬁrst mover is left with
10 − 3sT + rT where the second mover is left with 10 + sT + rT . The unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium of this game is that both send zero (0) amount assuming
that both players are self-interested.
3.1.2 The Transfer Control Game
It is a Dictator Game which only ﬁrst players play. They are asked to send a part
or none of the endowment, 10liras to their partners. The transferred amount is
multiplied by 3. However, they are also informed that second players could not
send any amount back to them.
3.1.3 The Return Control Game
It is a Dictator Game which only second players play. In this game, second players
decide how much money to send to their partners from given initial endowments.
The initial endowments are decided by the amount transferred by the ﬁrst players
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in the Trust Game. For example, let us assume that a ﬁrst player sent sT C liras
to his partner in the Trust Game. This amount is tripled by 3. Therefore, in the
Return Control Game the second player is informed that he has 10 + 3sT C liras
and his partner has 10 − sT C liras and he is asked to send a part or none of his
endowment to his partner.
3.1.4 Analysis of The Game
Let sT ∈ S denotes the amount of money that the ﬁrst player sends to the second
player in the Trust Game:
S = 0, 1, 2, ..., 10
Given sT , the second player decides how much money to send back to the ﬁrst
player, rT ∈ R:
R(sT ) = 0, 1, ...3sT
The ﬁrst mover’s decision in the Transfer Control Game is to choose sT C ∈ S .
If sT > sT C , then we can conclude that the ﬁrst player is motivated by trust.
Since in the Transfer Control Game, we eliminate the eﬀect of trusting in positive
reciprocity, it only represents the unconditional-altruistic behavior.
Let rRC ∈ R denotes the amount of money that the second player sends to the
ﬁrst player in the Return Control Game:
If rT > rRC , then we can conclude that the second player is motivated by the
positive reciprocity. Since in the absence of the ﬁrst player, second player does not
choose to send big amount of money. He sends more money when he thinks that
the ﬁrst mover was good to him.
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3.2 The Triadic Design Ultimatum Game
It consists of an Ultimatum Game and two control games. Subjects are randomly
assigned to either a ﬁrst mover role or a second mover role. Both ﬁrst players
and second players play the Ultimatum Game. Then, ﬁrst players play the Oﬀer
Control Game while second players play the Accept Control Game. After ﬁrst
two decisions, subjects’ role as ﬁrst mover or second mover is reversed and they
are rematched randomly. Then, they are asked to play the same game again with
reversed roles.
3.2.1 The Ultimatum Game
In the Ultimatom game, subjects are randomly assigned to either proposer role
or responder role. Proposers are randomly matched with responders and both do
not know who they are playing with. Proposers are asked to allocate 24 liras
between himself and their partners. Responders have two options: either accept
or reject the oﬀfer. If the responder rejects the oﬀer, both of the players end up
with 0 lira . If the responder accepts the oﬀer, the responder end up with the
proposed amount of money, x liras, while the proper ends up with 24 − x liras
. The unique sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game is that the proposer gets
the whole pie assuming that both players are self-interested.
3.2.2 The Offer Control Game
It is a Dictator Game which only proposers play. In this game, the proposer is
asked to allocate 24 liras between himself and his partner. However, in this game,
the second player does not have a power to accept or reject the oﬀer. The proposed
amount by the ﬁrst player directly determines their payoﬀs.
23
3.2.3 The Accept Control Game
It is a modiﬁed version of the Ultimatum Game which only responders play. In
this game, computer randomly generates a number between 1 and 10 for each of
the subject pairs. This number, oU , indicates the amount oﬀered for the ﬁrst
player and 24−oU liras for the second player by the computer. Then, the second
player is asked to indicate his response: accept or reject the oﬀer. If he rejects the
oﬀer, both of the players end up with 0 lira . If he accepts the oﬀer, the ﬁrst
player ends up with the proposed amount of money by the computer, oU liras,
while the second player ends up with 24 − oU liras .
3.2.4 Analysis Of the Game
Let oU ∈ O be the amount of money that the ﬁrst player oﬀers to the second player
in the Ultimatum Game:
O = 0, 1, 2, ..., 10
Given oU , the second player decides aU ∈ A whether to accept or reject the
oﬀer:
A(oU) = Accept, Reject
The ﬁrst mover’s decision in the Oﬀer Control Game is to choose oOC ∈ O .
If oU > oOC , then we can conclude that the ﬁrst player is motivated by the
fear of rejection. Since in the Oﬀer Control Game, we eliminate the possibility of
rejection, it only represents the unconditional-altruistic behaviour.
Let aAC ∈ A(oU) be the decision made by the second player in the Accept
Control Game:
If for almost same oﬀers in the Accept Control and the Ultimatum Game
aU = Reject but aAC = Accept, then we can conclude that the second player is
motivated by the negative reciprocity. Since in the absence of the ﬁrst player,
second player accepts the almost equal oﬀers made by a computer. The second
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player rejects low oﬀer when it comes from his partner.
3.3 The Dictator Game
In the Dictator Game, subjects are informed that their opponent is a charitable
organization. It means that they are endowed with 30 liras and asked to donate a
part or none of their endowment to a charitable organization, LÖSEV. This game
is played once. The unique Nash equilibrium for Dictator Games played in our
experiment is to oﬀer nothing to the other player. We compare the result of the
Dictator Game with the dictator controls in the triadic design experiments. The
average amount sent to the LÖSEV or to the partner is evaluated as altruistic
preferences.
In Table 2, experimental measures for social preferences are represented.
Table 2: Experimental Measures
Social Prefer-
ence
Method Measure
Trust the triadic
design -
Trust Game
Comparison of average amount sent as a
ﬁrst mover in the Trust Game and in the
Transfer Control Game
Altruism the Dictator
Game
Amount sent to the charitable organization
and the partner in the control games
Positive Reci-
procity
the triadic
design -
Trust Game
Comparison of average amount sent as a
second mover in the Trust Game and in the
Return Control Game
Negative Reci-
procity
the triadic
design -
Ultimatum
Game
Comparison of average amount sent as a
second mover in the Ultimatum Game and
in the Accept Control Game
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4 Results
Table 3 shows the mean values of demographic variables across treatments. Re-
sults are almost same. Table 4 provides a non-parametric analysis for the dis-
tributions of these variables. Wilcoxon rank-sum test tests the null hypothesis
that two independent samples are from populations with the same distribution.
According to the table, only average consumption (per month) and undergraduate
variables change signiﬁcantly across treatments. It seems that there are statisti-
cally more undergraduate students in the Neutral treatment than in the Happy
treatment (z = 1.696; p − value = 0.090) . Also, subjects in the Sad treatment
consumes statistically more money in a month than subjects in the Neutral treat-
ment ( z = −2.55; p − value = 0.011) and in the Happy treatment ( z = 1.76;
p − value = 0.079).
We proceed this section as follows: Firstly, we present the result of mood induc-
tion procedure. Secondly, we analyse the results of our triadic design experiments
for trust and positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity. Finally, we analyse the
result of the Dictator Game with a charitable organization and compare it with
related control games of the Trust and the Ultimatum Games.
4.1 Mood Induction
In order to validate whether movie clips induced certain emotions on the subjects,
at the end of the experiment, subjects are asked to answer the questions in the
Emotional Arousal Survey (Appendix A ). Table 5 shows the mean values of
subjective arousal scale, eleven discrete emotion scores - interested, happy, sad,
angry, fearful, anxious, scornful, surprised, warm hearted - and one positive aﬀect
variable and two negative aﬀect variables.
Based on the scales used in PANAS (Watson et al., 1988), we generated a
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Variables
Variable Neutral Happy Sad
Age 21.18 22.25 21.85
(0.56) (0.76) (0.57)
Male 0.68 0.54 0.56
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Avg. Consumption
(per month)
1239 1290 1644
(207.02) (119.02) (136.32)
Undergraduate 0.91 0.71 0.79
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07)
Econ major 0.23 0.25 0.12
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
# of Econ classes 2.41 2.75 2.53
(0.77) (0.96) (0.91)
# of Observations1 22 24 34
Notes: Mean values are represented. Standard errors in parenthesis. 1In the
neutral treatment, we have 22 data points for altruism scale and 18 data points
for the positive and negative reciprocity scale. Data in the neutral treatment
represents 22 subjects. However, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between mean
values of a 22-subject group and an 18-subject group for any of the variables.
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Table 4: Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test Results for the Demographic Variables
Variables Neutral vs Happy Neutral vs Sad Sad vs Happy
Age z=-0.889 z=-0.601 z=-0.430
[0.374] [0.548] [0.667]
Male z=0.962 z=0.912 z=0.128
[0.336] [0.361] [0.898]
Avg. Consumption z=-1.246 z=-2.552 z=1.758
[0.213] [0.011**] [0.079*]
Undergraduate z=1.696 z=1.134 z=0.745
[0.090*] [0.257] [0.456]
Econ major z=-0.179 z=1.081 z=-1.303
[0.858] [0.280] [-0.193]
# of Econ classes z=0.334 z=0.803 z=-0.177
[0.738] [ 0.422] [0.860]
Notes: Two-tailed Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test. p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; **
p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
variable which is called “Positive Aﬀect” by taking the average of the scores of
interested, happy, surprised and warm hearted. We generated two negative aﬀect
variables. One of them contains the scores of “sad”, “angry”, “fearful” and “anx-
ious” while the other one contains one additional variable: “disgusted”. In Table 5
and Table 6 we present the results for both of these variables, but, in the following
analyses since there is not any signiﬁcant diﬀerence among them, we only include
the one which does not contain “disgusted”.
Table 6 shows that the mood induction procedure is successful. According to
two sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test, the score of happiness is signiﬁcantly higher
in the Happy treatment than in the Neutral ( z = −3.58; p − value = 0.0003) and
the Sad treatments ( z = −5.73; p − value = 0.000). For the adjective “sad”, it
is statistically higher in the Sad treatment than in the Neutral ( z = −5.96; p −
value = 0.000) and the Happy treatments ( z = 6.23; p−value = 0.000). Also, the
scores of positive and negative aﬀect are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across treatments.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Emotion1 Variables
Variable Neutral Happy Sad
Subjective arousal 2.60 4.07 5.63
(0.29) (0.27) (0.19)
Interested 4.39 4.29 5.61
(0.39) (0.27) (0.22)
Happy 2.01 3.63 1.29
(0.25) (0.29) (0.09)
Sad 1.71 1.35 5.41
(0.19) (0.11) (0.24)
Angry 1.26 1.47 4.76
(0.11) (0.14) (0.24)
Fearful 1.51 1.59 3.41
(0.14) (0.22) (0.32)
Anxious 2.4 2.00 4.13
(0.31) (0.28) (0.34)
Disgusted 1.27 2.32 4.54
(0.13) (0.23) (0.25)
Scornful 1.29 2.32 1.35
(0.14) (0.29) (0.15)
Surprised 1.76 3.47 2.50
(0.19) (0.35) (0.26)
Warm hearted 1.80 3.78 1.10
(0.25) (0.30) (0.04)
Positive Aﬀect2 2.90 3.79 2.63
(0.18) (0.22) (0.10)
Negative Aﬀect3 1.72 1.60 4.43
(0.15) (0.16) (0.24)
Negative Aﬀect 24 1.63 1.75 4.45
(0.13) (0.15) (0.22)
Notes: Mean values are represented in the table. Standard errors in parenthesis.
1For subjective arousal scale, subjects rated the following statement: While I was
watching the ﬁlm, (1) “I felt no emotions at all” to (7) “I felt very intense emotions”.
For the discrete emotional arousal scales, subjects rated each adjective the extent
to which they felt each state as they were watching the ﬁlm clip. (1“not at all”,
7“very intense”). 2 PA: average of interested, happy, surprised and warm hearted
scales. 3 NA: average of sad, angry, fearful and anxious scores. 4 NA2: average of
sad, angry, fearful, anxious and disgusted scores.
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Table 6: Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test Results for the Emotion Scores
Variables Neutral vs Happy Neutral vs Sad Sad vs Happy
Subjective arousal z=-3.238 z=-5.683 z=4.371
[0.001***] [0.000***] [0.000***]
Interested z=0.077 z=-2.465 z=3.481
[0.938] [0.014**] [0.0005***]
Happy z=-3.579 z=2.797 z=-5.731
[0.0003***] [0.005***] [0.000***]
Sad z=1.262 z=-5.964 z=6.230
[0.207] [0.000***] [0.000***]
Angry z=-1.308 z=-6.170 z=6.116
[0.190] [0.000***] [0.000***]
Fearful z=0.686 z=-4.025 z=4.113
[0.493] [0.0001***] [0.000***]
Anxious z=1.045 z=-3.268 z=4.023
[ 0.296] [0.001***] [0.0001***]
Disgusted z=-3.782 z=-5.927 z=4.821
[0.0002***] [0.000***] [0.000***]
Scornful z=-3.213 z=0.177 z=-3.656
[0.001***] [0.860] [0.0003***]
Surprised z=-3.451 z=-1.789 z=-2.074
[0.0006***] [0.074*] [0.038**]
Warm hearted z=-4.054 z=2.858 z=-6.202
[0.0001***] [0.004**] [0.000***]
Positive Aﬀect z=-3.762 z=-0.966 z=-3.830
[0.0002***] [0.334] [0.0001***]
Negative Aﬀect z=0.967 z=-5.809 z=5.888
[0.334] [0.000***] [0.000***]
Negative Aﬀect 2 z=-0.365 z=-5.902 z=5.883
[0.715] [0.000***] [0.000***]
Notes: Two-tailed Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test. p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; **
p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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While positive aﬀect is signiﬁcantly higher in the Happy treatment than in the
Neutral ( z = −3.76; p − value = 0.0002) and the Sad treatments ( z = −3.83;
p − value = 0.0001), negative aﬀect is signiﬁcantly higher in the Sad treatment
than in the Neutral ( z = −5.81; p − value = 0.000) and the Sad treatments (
z = 5.89; p − value = 0.000). Since movie clips were successfully aroused the
expected emotions, from now on we call subjects in the Happy treatment as happy
people and subjects in the Sad treatment as sad people.
4.2 Trust and Positive Reciprocity
Before moving on to the econometric analysis, we present ﬁgures that represent
distributions of the amount transferred and returned across treatments. Figure
1 shows the amount of transfer and return for each subject pairs in the Neutral
treatment, in the Happy treatment and in the Sad treatment. According to them,
the amounts of transfers and returns seem to be higher in the Sad treatment than
others. While 33% of the subjects in the Happy treatment return an amount
which is equal to the transfer they received, it is 22% in the Neutral treatment
and 21% in the Sad treatment. In addition, the diﬀerence between return and
transfer amounts seems to be higher in the Sad treatment than others. In the Sad
treatment, both ﬁrst players and second players send higher amounts than they
do in the Happy and the Neutral treatments.
To conclude that ﬁrst players are motivated by trust, their transfer amount
should be higher in the Trust Game than in the Transfer Control Game. In Fig-
ure 2, we compare the amounts transferred in these two games for each treatment.
Y-axis shows the number of subjects who transfer the given amounts in the Trust
Game and in the Transfer Control Game. According to these graphs, the amount
of money transferred in the Transfer Control Game seems to be higher in the Sad
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Figure 1: Transfer vs Return across Treatments
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Figure 2: Transfer vs Transfer Control across Treatments
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Figure 3: Return vs Return Control across Treatments
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treatment than other treatments. This might indicate that sad people behave
more altruistically than people in a neutral mood and than happy people. Fur-
thermore, while 22% of the subjects in the Neutral treatment send zero amount in
the Transfer Control Game, it is 26% in the Sad treatment and 33% in the Happy
treatment.
If second players return more amount in the Trust Game than in the Return
Control Game, then one could conclude that they are motivated by positive reci-
procity. Figure 3 compares the amounts that second players return in these
games. Graphs suggest that the diﬀerence between the amounts of return in the
Trust Game and in the Return Control Game is smaller in the Neutral treatment
than others while the amounts of return are signiﬁcantly higher in the Sad treat-
ments than others. In addition, while in the Sad treatment, 12.5% of the subjects
send zero amount in the Return Control Game, it is 25% in the Happy treatment
and 33% in the Neutral treatment. This would suggest that sad people are more
altruistic or inequality averse than others.
4.2.1 First Mover Behaviour in the Trust Game
Table 7 represents the mean values of the amount sent and the amount returned
in the Trust Game and compares them across treatments. We use two tests to com-
pare the distribution of data: two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test and one-tailed
t-test with unequal variances. While Wilcoxon test does not report any signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence between amount transferred by the ﬁrst player across treatments,
t-test reports that amount of transfer is statistically higher in the Sad treatment
than in the Neutral (t = −1.72; p − value = 0.046) and in the Happy treatment
(t = 1.77; p − value = 0.041) at a 5% signiﬁcance level. If we only use the Trust
Game without its control games to detect trusting behaviour of the ﬁrst players,
this data would provide a support for Hypothesis 1.1 and Hypothesis 1.2 which
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respectively state that sad people trust more than people in the neutral mood and
happy people.
Table 8 shows the eﬀects happy and positive aﬀects on the amount transferred
in the Trust Game. Model 1 is the baseline regression that regress happy on the
amount sent. Happy is a dummy variable which takes 1 (one) if the subjects is
in the Happy treatment and 0 (zero) if he/she is in the Neutral treatment. In
model 2, we control for age, male, amount of consumption in a month and order
eﬀect. First round is a dummy variable which takes 1 (one) if the subject plays
the Trust Game and its control games in the ﬁrst place and 0 (zero) if the subjects
plays the Trust Game and its control games after the Ultimatum Game and its
controls. In model 3, we add two more controls: the number of economy classes
they took and the frequency of engaging extreme sports such as bungee-jumping,
rafting, and diving. Model 4, 5 and 6 incorporates positive aﬀect variable into
the regression. Model 4 observes the eﬀect of positive aﬀects on the amount sent
by the ﬁrst player. Again, only observing the behaviour in the Trust Game, the
results of the OLS regression (model 1,2 and 3) do not support the Hypothesis 1.3
which states that happy people trust less than people in neutral mood. On the
other hand, model 4,5 and 6 ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation between positive aﬀect and
the amount sent by the ﬁrst player. According to the model 6 which includes all
control variables, one unit increase in the positive aﬀect leads to decrease in the
amount sent by 0.62 TL , ceteris paribus. It is statistically signiﬁcantly at 10%
signiﬁcance level ( p − value = 0.063). In this model, the constant term is also
insigniﬁcant at 1%, 5% or 10% levels.( p−value = 0.105). In addition, throughout
the models, we could not ﬁnd any order eﬀect on trusting behaviour. Subjects who
play this game ﬁrst do not send signiﬁcantly more or less money than subjects who
play this game in the second.
Table 9 replicates the same regression models as in Table 8 but replaces happy
36
Table 7: Comparison of Trust and Positive Reciprocity Across Treatments- the
Investment Game
Treatment Transfer
Mean
Return Mean
Neutral Tr. 3.94 3.78
(0.574) (0.794)
Happy Tr. 3.92 3.87
(0.561) (0.597)
Sad Tr. 5.38 8.29
(0.607) (1.513)
Wilcoxon test1
Neutral vs Happy z=0.32 z=-0.269
[0.747] [0.788]
Neutral vs Sad z=-0.95 z=-1.714
[0.339] [0.087*]
Sad vs Happy z=1.37 z=1.635
[0.172] [0.102]
t-test2
Neutral vs Happy t=0.035 t=-0.098
[0.486] [0.461]
Neutral vs Sad t=-1.72 t=-2.642
[0.046**] [0.006***]
Sad vs Happy t=1.77 t=2.716
[0.041**] [0.005***]
Notes: 1 Denotes a two-tailed Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test. 2 Denotes a one-tailed
t-test with unequal variances. Standard errors in paranthesis. p-values in brackets.
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 8: Regression Analysis: The eﬀect of Happy/Positive Aﬀect on the Amount
Sent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
without
control
variables
without
control
variables
Happy -0.03 1.00 0.20 - - -
[0.973] [0.989] [0.834]
Positive Aﬀect - - - -0.63 -0.67 -0.62
[0.043**] [0.030**] [0.063*]
First round1 - 0.52 0.70 - 0.54 0.46
[0.625] [0.477] [0.476] [0.537]
Age - -0.06 -0.015 - -0.044 -0.042
[0.630] [0.898] [0.674] [0.696]
Male - 0.33 0.50 - 1.57 1.41
[0.710] [0.606] [0.030**] [0.067*]
Consumption - -
0.0002
-
0.0004
- 0.0007 0.0007
[0.639] [0.946] [0.099*] [0.152]
# of Econ
classes
- - -0.088 - - 0.031
[0.197] [0.721]
Extreme
Sports2
2 (one/two
times)
- - 1.27 - - 1.38
[0.209] [0.083*]
3 (occasionally) - - 1.95 - - 1.80
[0.214] [0.127]
4 (often) - - - - 3.40
[0.039**]
5 (every
chance)
- - - - 0.03
[0.775]
Constant 3.94 5.08 3.08 6.42 5.30 4.23
[0.000***] [0.099*] [0.277] [0.000***] [0.051*] [0.105]
Notes: 1 is a dummy variable which takes 1 if subjects play this game ﬁrst and
takes zero if subjects play this game after the Trust Game. 2 with respect to 1
(never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 9: Regression Analysis: The eﬀect of Sad/Negative Aﬀect on the Amount
Sent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
without
control
variables
without
control
variables
Sad 1.44 1.06 0.77 - - -
[0.091*] [0.240] [0.436]
Negative Aﬀect - - - 0.23 0.20 0.17
[0.268] [0.354] [0.396]
First round1 - 0.43 0.15 - 0.24 0.18
[0.617] [0.867] [0.743] [0.796]
Age - -0.06 -0.09 - -0.04 -0.05
[0.699] [0.577] [0.745] [0.662]
Male - 2.18 2.08 - 1.59 1.40
[0.011**][0.031**] [0.032**][0.07*]
Consumption - 0.001 0.001 - 0.0007 0.0006
[0.033**][0.050**] [0.134] [0.212]
# of Econ
classes
- - 0.14 - - 0.06
[0.187] [0.457]
Extreme Sports2
2 (one or two
times)
- - 1.17 - - 1.45
[0.215] [0.07*]
3 (occasionally) - - 2.30 - - 1.76
[0.172] [0.152]
4 (often) - - 2.78 - - 3.55
[0.122] [0.04**]
5 (every chance) - - -0.31 - - 0.77
[0.819] [0.415]
Constant 3.94 2.55 2.23 3.91 2.84 2.27
[0.000***] [0.478] [0.523] [0.000***] [0.332] [0.408]
Notes: 1 is a dummy variable which takes 1 if subjects play this game ﬁrst and
takes zero if subjects play this game after the Trust Game. 2 with respect to 1
(never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 10: Regression Analysis: The eﬀect of Being Emotionally Aroused on the
Amount Sent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
without
control
variables
without
control
variables
Emotion1 0.83 0.72 0.44 - - -
[0.247] [0.344] [0.579]
Sad vs Happy2 - - - -1.47 -1.20 -0.96
[0.082*] [0.174] [0.299]
First round3 - 0.18 0.16 - 0.35 -0.56
[0.804] [0.824] [0.689] [0.542]
Age - -0.05 -0.06 - -0.01 -0.04
[0.678] [0.619] [0.955] [0.770]
Male - 1.59 1.41 - 2.02 1.85
[0.03**] [0.071*] [0.025**][0.064*]
Consumption - 0.0007 0.0007 - 0.0006 0.0005
[0.105] [0.184] [0.282] [0.449]
# of Econ
classes
- - 0.06 - - 0.09
[0.493] [0.284]
Extreme Sports4
2 (one or two
times)
- - 1.46 - - 1.33
[0.065*] [0.179]
3 (occasionally) - - 1.70 - - 1.02
[0.182] [0.502]
4 (often) - - 3.51 - - 2.84
[0.045**] [0.139]
5 (every chance) - - 0.51 - - -0.63
[0.636] [0.644]
Constant 3.94 3.03 2.50 5.38 3.62 3.56
[0.000***] [0.252] [0.336] [0.000***] [0.258] [0.261]
Notes: 1 Emotion is a dummy variable which takes 0 (zero) if subject is in the
Neutral treatment and takes 1 (one) if subject is either in the Happy treatment or
in the Sad treatment. 2 3 is a dummy variable which takes 1 if subjects play this
game ﬁrst and takes zero if subjects play this game after the Trust Game. 4 with
respect to 1 (never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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with sad and positive aﬀect with negative aﬀect. Only model 1 shows a signiﬁcant
relation between amount sent and sad. It means that people in the Sad treatment
sent 1.44 TL more than people in the Neutral treatment while there is no other
variable is controlled for ( p−value = 0.091). It is statistically signiﬁcant at a 10%
level. After the control variables are added into the regression, this signiﬁcance
disappears. If only the behaviour in the Trust Game is considered, this result
weakly supports Hypothesis 1.1 which states that sad people trust more than
people in neutral mood. The results of model 4, 5 and 6 also do not ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant relation between negative aﬀect and the amount sent. Also,
there is order eﬀect in neither of the models. It means that trusting behaviour of
subjects who play this game ﬁrst do not statistically diﬀer from trusting behaviour
of subjects who play this game after the Ultimatum Game and its control games.
In the following analysis, a dummy variable which is called “emotion” is gener-
ated. It takes 1 if data comes from either the Happy treatment or the Sad treatment
and 0 (zero) otherwise. It helps to observe the eﬀect of being emotionally aroused
on trusting behaviour. To compare the diﬀerence between being in a happy mood
and being in a sad mood, “sad vs happy” variable is used. It takes 1 if data comes
from the Happy treatment and 0 (zero) if it comes from the Sad treatment. The
same regression models as in Table 8 and 9 are applied in Table 10 with emotion
and sad vs happy dummy variables. There is not signiﬁcant relation between being
emotionally aroused on the amount sent. It is expected since the signiﬁcance of
sad is not as strong as to aﬀect the subjects’ behaviour when it is combined with
the data of the Happy treatment. In model 4 where there is not control variables
in the regression, happy subjects transfer 1.47 TL less in the Trust Game than
sad subjects at a 10% signiﬁcance level (p − value = 0.082). Since control vari-
ables are added into the model, this variable loses its signiﬁcance and the constant
term is signiﬁcant at 1% level, this result weakly supports Hypothesis 1.2 which
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states that sad people trust more than happy people. In Table 10 too, the order in
which subjects play this game does not statistically aﬀect their trusting behaviour.
4.2.2 Second Mover Behaviour in the Trust Game
Table 7 shows the mean values of the amount returned in the Trust Game and
compares statistically their diﬀerences across treatments. Since Wilcoxon rank-
sum test does not report any statistical diﬀerence between the amounts transferred
in the Trust Game across treatments, we can compare the mean values of return
by this test. It reports that sad subjects return more money than subjects in a
neutral mood at a 10% signiﬁcance level ( z = −1.71, p − value = 0.087). If
we only consider the Trust Game, this result would support Hypothesis 2.1 which
states that sad people positively reciprocate more than people in a neutral mood.
Furthermore, t-test also detects signiﬁcantly higher amount of return in the Sad
treatment than in the Neutral treatment (t = −2.64; p − value = 0.006) and in
the Happy treatment (t = −2.72; p − value = 0.005) at a 1% signiﬁcance level.
Since this test also ﬁnd statistical diﬀerence between the amount sent in the Sad
treatment and in the Neutral or the Happy treatment, it could be problematic to
state there exists a higher level of positive reciprocity in the Sad treatment. That
is why, we generated various variables related to amount returned in the Trust
Game. Table 11 shows their mean values and compares them across treatments.
Relative return is the ratio of the amount returned by the second player to 3
times the amount transferred by the ﬁrst player. It is commonly used as a rate of
responders’ reciprocal behaviour (Ashraf et al., 2006). The second column shows
and compares the mean rate of subjects who return an amount which is greater
than and equal to the amount of transfer that they receive. Third column shows
and compares the mean rate of subjects who return an amount which is strictly
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greater than the amount of transfer they receive. Fourth column shows the mean
rate of subjects who return an amount that makes both players to end up with an
equal payoﬀs. Last column represents the rate of subjects who return zero amount
to the ﬁrst player. According to Table 11, sad people relatively return more money
than people in the neutral mood (t = −1.87;p − value = 0.034). Also, sad people
are more likely to return strictly greater amount than what they received with
respect to happy people (t = 1.50;p − value = 0.070). The Wilcoxon and the t-
test suggest that sad people are more likely to make fair returns than happy people
(Wilcoxon: z = 1.94; p − value = 0.053, t = 2.15;p − value = 0.018). Finally,
people in a neutral mood are more likely to return zero amount than sad people
(z = 1.79;p − value = 0.074). If we only consider the Trust Game to analyze
second mover behaviours, all of these four results would support Hypothesis 2.1
and Hypothesis 2.2 which state that sad people positively reciprocate more than
people in a neutral mood and happy people, respectively.
The same regression models as in Table 8, 9 and 10 are replicated in Table 12,
13 and 14, respectively but we replace the dependent variable with the amount
returned and add a control variable for amount sent. Table 12 shows that neither
happy nor positive aﬀects statistically change the amount of money second players
returned to the ﬁrst players. In addition, amount sent has a signiﬁcant and positive
eﬀect on the amount returned in all of the six regression models. It means that
second movers’ behaviour is reciprocal. Consistent with the previous results, no
order eﬀect is found.
Table 13 represents the eﬀect sad and negative aﬀects on the amount of money
second movers return after seeing the amount sent by the ﬁrst movers. Only in
the model 1 which includes a control variable for the amount sent, there exist a
signiﬁcant and positive impact of being sad on the amount returned. Subjects in
the Sad treatment return 2.10 TL more money to their counterparts than subjects
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Table 11: Comparison of Various Return Variables Across Treatments
Treatment Relative
Return
Mean1
Return
≥
Trans-
fer
Mean2
Return
>
Transfer
Mean3
Fair
Return
Mean4
Zero
Return
Mean
Neutral Tr. 0.33 0.72 0.44 0.22 0.28
(0.056) (0.109) (0.12) (0.101) (0.109)
Happy Tr. 0.41 0.75 0.33 0.08 0.125
(0.069) (0.09) (0.01) (0.06) (0.069)
Sad Tr. 0.48 0.79 0.53 0.29 0.09
(0.059) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05)
Wilcoxon rank-
sum test5
Neutral vs Happy z=0.22 z=-0.2 z=0.72 z=1.26 z=1.23
[0.823] [0.841] [0.468] [0.208] [0.218]
Neutral vs Sad z=-1.352 z=-0.58 z=-0.58 z=-0.551 z=1.79
[0.176] [0.562] [0.564] [0.581] [0.074*]
Sad vs Happy z=0.23 z=0.40 z=1.47 z=1.94 z=-0.45
[0.229] [0.694] [0.143] [0.053*] [0.65]
t-test6
Neutral vs Happy t=-0.87 t=-0.20 t=0.71 t=1.20 t=1.19
[0.20] [0.42] [0.24] [0.121] [0.122]
Neutral vs Sad t=-1.87 t=-0.55 t=-0.57 t=-0.56 t=1.59
[0.034**] [0.291] [0.285] [0.289] [0.06*]
Sad vs Happy t=0.82 t=0.38 t=1.50 t=2.15 t=-0.43
[0.207] [0.35] [0.070*] [0.018**] [0.33]
Notes: 1 Relative return is the ratio of the amount returned by the second player
to the 3 times amount transfered by the ﬁrst player. 2 It is a dummy variable
which takes one if the amount returned by the second player is greater than or
equal to the amount transfered by the ﬁrst player and zero otherwise. 3 It is a
dummy variable which takes one if the amount returned by the second player is
greater than the amount transfered by the ﬁrst player and zero otherwise. 4 Fair
return is a dummy variable which takes one if both players end up with same
payoﬀs because of the amount returned by the second player and zero otherwise.
5 Denotes a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 6 Denotes a one-tailed t-test
with unequal variances. Standard errors in parenthesis. p-values in brackets. *
p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 12: Regression Analysis: The eﬀect of Happy/Positive Aﬀect on the Amount
Returned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Happy 0.11 -0.04 -0.23 - - -
[0.891] [0.963] [0.791]
Positive Aﬀect - - - -0.33 -0.35 -0.04
[0.391] [0.327] [0.942]
Amount Sent 0.62 0.58 0.65 1.47 1.50 1.55
[0.006***] [0.020**] [0.004***] [0.000***] [0.000***] [0.000***]
First round1 - 0.91 1.24 - 1.52 1.37
[0.281] [0.124] [0.154] [0.169]
Age - 0.004 -0.04 - 0.12 0.04
[0.963] [0.762] [0.291] [0.826]
Male - 0.51 0.79 - -0.004 -0.25
[0.615] [0.445] [0.998] [0.862]
Consumption - -0.0002 0.00008 - 0.001 0.0008
[0.798] [0.911] [0.133] [0.399]
# of Econ
classes
- - -0.06 - - 0.21
[0.484] [0.454]
Extreme Sports2
2 (one or two
times)
- - 2.42 - - 3.80
[0.01***] [0.021**]
3 (occasionally) - - 0.45 - - 2.76
[0.055*] [0.043**]
4 (often) - - - - 5.07
[0.009***]
5 (every chance) - - - - 3.29
[0.221]
Constant 1.31 0.91 -0.71 0.2 -5.01 -6.50
[0.179] [0.695] [0.565] [0.909] [0.107] [0.076*]
Notes: 1 is a dummy variable which takes 1 if subjects play this game ﬁrst and
takes zero if subjects play this game after the Trust Game. 2 with respect to 1
(never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 13: Regression Analysis: The eﬀect of Sad/Negative Aﬀect on the Amount
Returned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sad 2.10 1.25 0.27 - - -
[0.042**] [0.284] [0.847]
Negative Aﬀect - - - 0.43 0.30 0.25
[0.175] [0.373] [0.436]
Amount Sent 1.68 1.71 1.87 1.42 1.46 1.52
[0.000***] [0.000***] [0.000***] [0.000***] [0.000***]
First round1 - 1.59 1.29 - 1.31 1.29
[0.268] [0.296] [0.226] [0.204]
Age - 0.18 0.10 - 0.12 0.03
[0.344] [0.674] [0.318] [0.863]
Male - -0.31 -0.84 - 0.05 -0.19
[0.863] [0.637] [0.972] [0.890]
Consumption - 0.0007 0.0005 - 0.001 0.0007
[0.484] [0.678] [0.217] [0.498]
# of Econ
classes
- - 0.31 - - 0.22
[0.319] [0.398]
Extreme Sports2
2 (one or two
times)
- - 4.07 - - 3.75
[0.042**] [0.015**]
3 (occasionally) - - 2.02 - - 2.74
[0.336] [0.046**]
4 (often) - - 5.38 - - 4.93
[0.024**] [0.006***]
5 (every chance) - - 4.43 - - 3.34
[0.166] [0.144]
Constant -6.53 -8.02 -8.90 -1.88 -6.59 -6.86
[0.080*] [0.06*] [0.107] [0.201] [0.041**] [0.059*]
Notes: 1 is a dummy variable which takes 1 if subjects play this game ﬁrst and
takes zero if subjects play this game after the Trust Game. 2 with respect to 1
(never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 14: Regression Analysis: The eﬀect of Being Emotionally Aroused on the
Amount Returned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Emotion1 1.50 0.74 0.29 - - -
[0.068*] [0.415] [0.761]
Sad vs Happy2 - - - -2.33 -1.78 -1.22
[0.063*] [0.161] [0.339]
Amount Sent 1.43 1.48 1.55 1.43 1.52 1.57
[0.000***][0.000***][0.000***][0.000***][0.000***][0.000***]
First round2 - 1.27 0.31 - 1.21 0.89
[0.804] [0.211] [0.398] [0.522]
Age - 0.12 0.03 - 0.12 0.02
[0.333] [0.857] [0.425] [0.916]
Male - 0.02 -0.023 - 0.27 -0.08
[0.988] [0.870] [0.879] [0.964]
Consumption - 0.001 0.0008 - 0.001 0.001
[0.164] [0.430] [0.109] [0.376]
# of Econ classes - - 0.21 - - 0.24
[0.413] [0.379]
Extreme Sports3
2 (one or two times) - - 3.79 - - 3.56
[0.017**] [0.053*]
3 (occasionally) - - 2.71 - - 2.64
[0.055*] [0.160]
4 (often) - - 5.00 - - 4.25
[0.008***] [0.033**]
5 (every chance) - - 3.18 - - 2.16
[0.177] [0.416]
Constant -6.53 -6.34 -6.63 0.61 -5.59 -5.92
[0.071*] [0.034**] [0.074*] [0.593] [0.114] [0.207]
Notes: 1 Emotion is a dummy variable which takes 0 (zero) if subject is in the
Neutral treatment and takes 1 (one) if subject is either in the Happy treatment
or in the Sad treatment. 2 is a dummy variable which takes 1 if subjects play this
game ﬁrst and takes zero if subjects play this game after the Trust Game. 3 with
respect to 1 (never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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in the Neutral treatment. This relation is signiﬁcant at 5% level (p-value=0.042).
The constant term in this model is signiﬁcant at 10% level (p − value = 0.080).
After the addition of other control variables in model 2 and model 3, it losses
its signiﬁcance. Model 4, 5 and 6 suggest that negative aﬀect does not alter the
amount returned by the second movers signiﬁcantly. In all of the models in Table
13, as is expected, amount sent by the ﬁrst mover has a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the amount returned by the second mover at 1% signiﬁcance level. It
means that second movers’ behaviour is reciprocal when they are in a sad/negative
mood. In addition, the order that subjects played this game does not statistically
change the amount returned.
Table 14 shows the relation between being emotionally aroused and the amount
returned and the diﬀerence between the eﬀect of happy and sad on the amount
returned. Since happy does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the amount returned as
is captured in Table 12, emotion variable is expect to show an eﬀect on the amount
returned in a same direction with the variable of sad but with a lower magnitude
and p-value. As expected, second players who are emotionally aroused returned
signiﬁcantly more amount to the ﬁrst players than people in a neutral mood at
10% signiﬁcance level (p−value = 0.068). Its impact disappears as we add control
variables into the regression . According to the model 4 where only amount sent
is controlled, happy people return 2.33 TL less than sad people, ceteris paribus.
This eﬀect is signiﬁcant at 10% level (p-value=0.063) and disappears when more
control variables are incorporated into the regression . In addition, amount sent
has a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on the amount returned in all of the six regres-
sion models. It means that second movers’ behaviour is reciprocal. As a result, if
only the Trust Game is used without its controls to examine the second mover be-
haviour, it would weakly support Hypothesis 2.1 and Hypothesis 2.2 which state
that sad people positively reciprocate more than people in a neutral mood and
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happy people. Throughout Table 14, no order eﬀect is found while the amount
sent has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the amount returned at 1% level.
4.2.3 First Mover Behaviour in the Triadic Design - Trust Game
Our experimental design allows us to separate trust from altruistic other-regarding
motives. A ﬁrst player in the Trust Game sends a positive amount of her/his
endowment because of two possible reasons: unconditional altruism or trust. If
she/he just want to increase her unknown partner’s payoﬀs by decreasing her/his
own payoﬀ, then this seems to be due to unconditional altruism. If she/he trusts
that her/his unknown partner will send back a positive amount that makes both
parties better of than the case where the ﬁrst player sends nothing, then it could
be named as trust. Under the design of the Trust Game separating two possible
motives seem to be impossible. As is mentioned in the Section 3, we add a control
game to diﬀerentiate between altruism and trust. In Table 15, we use a two-tailed
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test and a one-tailed paired-samples t-test to
compare the amount sent in the Trust Game with the amount sent in the Dictator
Control Game which we call the Transfer Control Game. In the control game, ﬁrst
player can send a part or none of his/her endowment to the second player, but, on
the contrary to the Trust Game, the second player cannot return any amount to
the ﬁrst player. Both tests conclude that the amount sent in the Investment Game
is statistically signiﬁcantly higher than the amount sent in the Transfer Control
Game in the Neutral, Happy and Sad Treatments at 1% signiﬁcance level. In other
words, we ﬁnd that subjects in each treatments are motivated by the trust rather
than unconditional altruism. These results provide a support for the literature on
the existence of trust in the triadic-design experiments (Cox, 2001; Cox & Deck,
2006).
Next, in Table 16, we employ a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test and one-
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Table 15: Comparison of Trust and Positive Reciprocity within Treatment - Triadic
Experimental Design
Treatment Neutral Tr. Happy Tr. Sad Tr.
Wilcoxon test1
Transfer vs Transfer
Control
z=5.37
[0.000***]
z=2.53
[0.009***]
z=4.5
[0.000***]
Return vs Return Con-
trol
z=-0.30
[0.764]
z=-0.20
[0.839]
z=-1.18
[0.236]
t-test2
Transfer vs Transfer
Control
t=3.54
[0.0004***]
t=2.66
[0.008***]
t=3.72
[0.0002***]
Return vs Return Con-
trol
t=-0.18
[0.428]
t=-0.47
[0.320]
t=-0.89
[0.189]
Notes: 1 Denotes a two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. 2 Denotes
a one-tailed paired-samples t-test. p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05;
*** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 16: Comparison of Trust and Positive Reciprocity Across Treatments- Tri-
adic Experimental Design
Treatment Transfer
Mean
Transfer
Con-
trol
Mean
Difference
Trans-
fer
Mean1
Return
Mean
Return
Con-
trol
Mean
Difference
Return
Mean2
Neutral Tr. 3.94 1.33 2.61 3.78 3.89 -0.11
(0.574) (0.457) (0.49) (0.794) (1.06) (0.604)
Happy Tr. 3.92 2.17 1.75 3.87 4.33 -0.46
(0.561) (0.557) (0.69) (0.597) (1.24) (0.967)
Sad Tr. 5.38 2.56 2.82 8.29 9.23 -0.94
(0.607) (0.442) (0.63) (1.513) (1.45) (1.05)
Wilcoxon
test3
Neutral vs
Happy
z=0.32 z=-1.21 z=1.09 z=-0.27 z=-0.19 z=0.04
[0.747] [0.225] [0.275] [0.788] [0.846] [0.968]
Neutral vs Sad z=-0.95 z=-1.99 z=0.42 z=-1.71 z=-2.36 z=0.81
[0.339] [0.046**] [0.677] [0.087*] [0.018**] [0.420]
Sad vs Happy z=1.37 z=0.93 z=0.63 z=1.635 z=2.271 z=-0.58
[0.172] [0.35] [0.53] [0.102] [0.023**] [0.562]
t-test4
Neutral vs
Happy
t=0.035 t=-1.16 t=1.02 t=-
0.098
t=-0.27 t=0.30
[0.486] [0.127] [0.157] [0.461] [0.393] [0.381]
Neutral vs Sad t=-1.72 t=-1.93 t=-0.27 t=-
2.642
t=-2.98 t=0.68
[0.046**] [0.03**] [0.395] [0.006***] [0.002***] [0.249]
Sad vs Happy t=1.77 t=0.55 t=1.15 t=2.72 t=2.57 t=-0.34
[0.041**] [0.292] [0.128] [0.005***] [0.006***] [0.368]
Notes: 1 is the amount sent in the Investment Game minus the amount sent in
the Transfer Control Game. 2 is the amount returned in the Investment Game
minus the amount returned in the Return Control Game. 3 Denotes a two-tailed
Wilcoxon Rank-sum test. 4 Denotes a one-tailed t-test with unequal variances.
p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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tailed t-test to compare this behaviour across treatments. In the ﬁrst column,
transfer mean represents the mean value of amount sent in the Trust Game and its
diﬀerence across treatments while transfer control mean represents the mean value
of amount sent in the Transfer Control Game. Third column of Table 16 shows the
mean value of the amount sent in the Trust Game minus the amount sent in the
Transfer Control Game. If this diﬀerence signiﬁcantly diﬀers across treatments,
then trusting behaviour changes with emotions. Although amount transferred
is signiﬁcantly higher in the Sad treatments, the diﬀerences in transfer means
does not diﬀer statistically across treatments. It may be due to the fact that the
amount transferred in the Transfer Control Game is statistically higher in the Sad
treatment than the Neutral treatment (Wilcoxon: z = −1.99; p − value = 0.046,
t-test: t = −1.93; p − value = 0.03). Therefore, these results does not support
Hypothesis 1.1 and Hypothesis 1.2 which state that sad people trust more. The
diﬀerence between the results which analyse only the Trust Game and the results
which analyse triadic-design experiments is because of the reason that the results
of the Trust Game combines both altruism and trust while the triadic design
experiment diﬀerentiates between them.
4.2.4 Second Mover Behaviour in the Triadic Design - Trust Game
Our experimental design also allows us to separate positive reciprocity from other
preferences. A second player in the Trust Game returns a positive amount of
her/his endowment to a ﬁrst player who sent a positive amount of money because
of two possible reasons: inequality aversion and positive reciprocity. If the second
player returns more money in the Trust Game than in the Dictator Control Game
which we call Return Control Game, then she/he is motivated by the positive
reciprocity not by the inequality aversion. (Remember that before the second
player returns money in the Investment Game if the ﬁrst player’s payoﬀ is A TL
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and the second player’s payoﬀ is B TL, then the Return Control Game starts
with the same payoﬀs. ) Table 15 also compares the amount of return in the
Trust Game and in the Return Control Game by using Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test and a one-tailed paired-samples t-test. Neither the Wilcoxon test
nor the t-test ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between amount returned in the Trust
Game and in the Return Control Game. It means that our subject pool in any of
the treatments are not motivated by positive reciprocity. On the contrary, since
the return amounts in these two games comes from populations with a statistically
same distribution, we conclude that our subjects in all of the treatments are mainly
motivated by inequality aversion.
Our next analysis shows that whether inequality aversion diﬀers across treat-
ments. In order to observe that, we employ two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test
and one-tailed t-test. The fourth column of Table 16 represents the mean values
of amount sent back by the second movers in the Trust Game and its diﬀerence
across treatments. Return control mean in the ﬁfth column shows the mean values
of amount sent in the Return Control Game. Last column of the table represents
the mean values of the amount returned in the Trust Game minus the amount
returned in the Return Control Game. If this diﬀerence statistically diﬀers across
treatments, that means that inequality aversion is aﬀected by one’s emotional
mood. Neither the Wilcoxon test nor the t-test detects a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between treatments. Therefore we could not support Hypothesis 6.1 and Hypoth-
esis 6.2 which state that sad people are more inequality-averse. Since the eﬀect of
being sad on the amount returned in the Trust Game disappears when the results
of triadic design experiment is analysed, it gives an evidence to support the idea
that the Trust Game itself is not able to separate the positive reciprocity from the
inequality-aversion.
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4.3 Negative Reciprocity
Before analysing the data with econometric methods, we present ﬁgures that rep-
resent the distribution of oﬀers proposed by the ﬁrst players and whether they are
accepted or rejected by the second players. Figure 4 shows accepted and rejected
oﬀers for each subject pair in the Neutral treatment, in the Happy treatment and
in the Sad treatment. According to Figure 4, the oﬀers seem to be higher in the
Sad treatments than others.However, the rate of rejection of oﬀers that are lower
than the half of the pie is lower in the Sad treatment (15%) than in the Happy
treatment (25%) and in the Neutral treatment (28%). This could indicate that
sad people negatively reciprocate less than the others.
To support the hypothesis that that ﬁrst players are motivated by fear rejection,
their oﬀers should be higher in the Ultimatum Game than in the Oﬀer Control
Game. In Figure 5, we compare the amount oﬀered in these two games. Y-axis
shows the number of subjects who oﬀer the given amounts in the Ultimatum Game
and in the Oﬀer Control Game. The results suggest that the amounts of oﬀers in
the Ultimatum Game and in the Oﬀer Control Game are almost same in the Sad
treatment, however, the diﬀerence seems to be bigger in the Neutral Treatment.
Therefore, sad people would motivated less by the fear of rejection than the people
in a neutral mood.
4.3.1 First Mover Behaviour in the Ultimatum Game
In the Ultimatum Game, ﬁrst movers make a generous oﬀer because of altruism,
inequality aversion or fear of rejection. In the triadic-design Ultimatum Game, we
explain how to separate these motives from each other. In this part, we interpret
the variable oﬀer as an indicator of fear of rejection as in the Ultimatum Game
literature. First column of Table 17 shows the mean value of amount oﬀered by
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Figure 4: Accepted and Rejected Oﬀers across Treatments
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Figure 5: Oﬀer vs Oﬀer Control across Treatments
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the ﬁrst player in the Ultimatum Game and compares it across treatments. Mean
oﬀers are 9.28 TL in the Neutral treatment, 9.46 TL in the Happy treatment,
10.91 TL in the Sad treatments. We test whether oﬀers diﬀer with respect to
our treatment variable -emotion- by using a two tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test
and one-tailed t-test. According to the results of the Wilcoxon test, subjects in
the Sad treatment oﬀer signiﬁcantly higher amount than subjects in the Neutral
treatment (z = −2.15; p − value = 0.031) and in the Happy treatment (z = 2.34;
p − value = 0.025) at 5% signiﬁcance level. The results of the t-test conﬁrms the
results of the Wilcoxon test. It also detects that subjects in the Sad treatment oﬀer
signiﬁcantly higher amount than subjects in the Neutral treatment (t = −2.01;
p − value = 0.025) and in the Happy treatment (z = 1.38; p − value = 0.087).
These results support the opposite of Hypothesis 3.1 and Hypothesis 3.2 which
state that sad people are motivated less by the fear of rejection.
Table 18 shows that the eﬀect of happy and positive aﬀects on the amount
oﬀered by the ﬁrst player. According to the results of the regression analysis,
neither happy nor positive aﬀect have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the amount oﬀered
in the Ultimatum Game. Thus, the results do not support Hypothesis 3.3 which
states that happy people are motivated less by the fear of rejection than people in
a neutral mood.
Table 19 represent the results of the regression analysis on the eﬀect of sad
and negative emotions on the amount oﬀered by the ﬁrst player in the Ultimatum
Game. In the ﬁrst model where there is not any control variable in the regression,
people in the Sad treatment oﬀer 1.63 TL more money compared to people in the
Neutral treatment (p-value=0.049). While controls for age, gender, consumption
level and order in which subjects play this game are added into the model, sad
loses its signiﬁcant eﬀect on the amount oﬀered. Whereas ,in the third model,
when the number of economics classes which subject has taken and the frequency
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Table 17: Comparison of Fear of Rejection and Inequality Aversion Across Treat-
ments - Triadic Experimental Design
Treatment Offer
Mean
Offer
Con-
trol
Mean
Difference
Offer
Mean1
Accept
Mean
PC
Offer
Mean
Accept
Con-
trol
Mean
Neutral Tr. 9.28 3.89 5.39 0.72 4.67 0.44
(0.66) (0.94) (1.01) (0.11) (0.31) (0.12)
Happy Tr. 9.46 5.25 4.21 0.71 3.71 0.37
(0.94) (1.21) (1.131) (0.09) (0.39) (0.101)
Sad Tr. 10.91 8.94 1.97 0.82 3.59 0.44
(0.47) (0.68) (0.72) (0.07) (0.30) (0.09)
Wilcoxon
test2
Neutral vs
Happy
z=0.052 z=-0.30 z=0.36 z=0.10 z=1.64 z=0.45
[0.958] [0.767] [0.721] [0.922] [0.101] [0.654]
Neutral vs Sad z=-2.15 z=-3.67 z=2.74 z=-0.84 z=2.10 z=0.02
[0.031**] [0.0002***][0.006***] [0.40] [0.036**] [0.982]
Sad vs Happy z=2.34 z=3.30 z=-2.42 z=1.03 z=-0.20 z=-0.5
[0.025**] [0.001***] [0.0156**] [0.304] [0.841] [0.617]
t-test3
Neutral vs
Happy
t=-0.16 t=-0.89 t=0.78 t=0.10 t=1.92 t=0.44
[0.438] [0.190] [0.22] [0.462] [0.031**] [0.331]
Neutral vs Sad t=-2.01 t=-4.36 t=2.77 t=-0.80 t=2.48 t=0.02
[0.025**] [0.0001***][0.004***] [0.216] [0.008***] [0.491]
Sad vs Happy t=1.38 t=2.66 t=-1.67 t=0.10 t=-0.24 t=0.50
[0.087*] [0.005***] [0.051*] [0.162] [0.404] [0.310]
Notes: 1 is the amount oﬀered in the Ultimatum Game minus the amount oﬀered
in the Oﬀer Control Game. 2 Denotes a two-tailed Wilcoxon Rank-sum test. 3
Denotes a one-tailed t-test with unequal variances. Standard errors in paranthesis.
p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 18: Regression Analysis: The eﬀect of Happy/Positive Aﬀect on the Amount
Oﬀered
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
without
control
variables
without
control
variables
Happy 0.18 1.22 0.88 - - -
[0.876] [0.230] [0.376]
Positive Aﬀect - - - -0.22 -0.17 -0.29
[0.577] [0.611] [0.442]
First round1 - 2.00 2.06 - 0.35 0.60
[0.108] [0.110] [0.679] [0.481]
Age - -0.40 -0.35 - -0.13 -0.1
[0.010***][0.029**] [0.335] [0.490]
Male - -0.35 -0.65 - -0.24 -0.19
[0.827] [0.705] [0.804] [0.930]
Consumption - -0.001 0.0007 - 0.0004 0.0006
[0.120] [0.299] [0.524] [0.310]
# of Econ
classes
- - -0.031 - - -0.05
[0.792] [0.583]
Extreme
Sports2
2 (one/two
times)
- - 0.35 - - -0.40
[0.787] [0.613]
3 (occasionally) - - 2.66 - - 0.95
[0.245] [0.569]
4 (often) - - - - -0.25
[0.807]
5 (every
chance)
- - - - -6.20
[0.000***]
Constant 9.27 18.14 16.72 10.71 12.72 12.16
[0.000***] [0.000***][0.000***][0.000***] [0.000***][0.000***]
Notes: 1 is a dummy variable which takes 1 if subjects play this game ﬁrst and
takes zero if subjects play this game after the Trust Game. 2 with respect to 1
(never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 19: Regression Analysis: The eﬀect of Sad/Negative Aﬀect on the Amount
Oﬀered
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
without
control
variables
without
control
variables
Sad 1.63 1.27 1.75 - - -
[0.049**] [0.147] [0.05**]
First round1 - 0.12 0.37 - 0.54 0.83
[0.891] [0.675] [0.535] [0.351]
Negative Aﬀect - - - 0.40 0.40 0.39
[0.054] [0.070*] [0.086*]
Age - -0.012 -0.03 - -0.13 -0.11
[0.913] [0.769] [0.256] [0.342]
Male - -0.74 -0.39 - -0.17 -0.03
[0.347] [0.769] [0.864] [0.977]
Consumption - 0.0008 0.0008 - 0.0003 0.0005
[0.228] [0.223] [0.687] [0.442]
# of Econ
classes
- - -0.06 - - -0.02
[0.401] [0.757]
Extreme Sports2
2 (one or two
times)
- - -0.52 - - -0.46
[0.550] [0.588]
3 (occasionally) - - -1.66 - - 0.92
[0.272] [0.591]
4 (often) - - -1.34 - - -0.35
[0.200] [0.759]
5 (every chance) - - -6.97 - - -5.86
[0.000***] [0.000***]
Constant 9.27 8.96 9.58 8.93 11.22 10.52
[0.000***] [0.002***][0.002***][0.000***] [0.000***][0.000***]
Notes: 1 is a dummy variable which takes 1 if subjects play this game ﬁrst and
takes zero if subjects play this game after the Trust Game. 2 with respect to 1
(never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 20: Regression Analysis: The eﬀect of Being Emotionally Aroused on the
Amount Oﬀered
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Emotion1 1.03 1.21 1.33 - - -
[0.207] [0.136] [0.094*]
Happy vs Sad2 - - - -1.45 -1.28 -1.78
[0.172] [0.213] [0.116]
First round3 - 0.61 0.93 - 0.82 1.38
[0.470] [0.278] [0.445] [0.204]
Age - -0.14 -0.13 - -0.08 -0.07
[0.278] [0.359] [0.570] [0.576]
Male - -0.18 -0.002 - 0.40 0.83
[0.849] [0.999] [0.732] [0.536]
Consumption - 0.0003 0.0005 - 0.0003 0.0006
[0.614] [0.389] [0.714] [0.462]
# of Econ
classes
- - -0.04 - - 0.02
[0.686] [0.796]
Extreme Sports4
2 (one or two
times)
- - -0.45 - - -1.16
[0.607] [0.231]
3 (occasionally) - - 0.73 - - 0.80
[0.655] [0.733]
4 (often) - - -0.55 - - -1.84
[0.603] [0.218]
5 (every chance) - - -6.59 - - -8.18
[0.000***] [0.000***]
Constant 9.28 11.61 10.89 10.91 11.63 11.26
[0.000***][0.000***][0.001***][0.002***][0.000***][0.000***]
Notes: 1 Emotion is a dummy variable which takes 0 (zero) if the subject is in the
Neutral treatment and takes 1 (one) if subject is either in the Happy treatment
or in the Sad treatment. 2 is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the subject is in
the Happy treatment and takes 0 if he/she in the Sad treatment. 3 is a dummy
variable which takes 1 if subjects play this game ﬁrst and takes zero if subjects
play this game after the Trust Game. 4 with respect to 1 (never). p-values in
brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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of engaging extreme sports are added into the control variables, sad statistically
aﬀects the amount oﬀered in the Ultimatum Game. Subjects in the Sad treatment
oﬀer 1.75 TL more than subjects in the Neutral treatment, ceteris paribus (p-
value=0.050). Therefore, these results oppose to Hypothesis 3.1 which states that
sad people are motivated less by the fear of rejection than people in a neutral
mood. The results of model 5 and 6 support the opposite of this hypothesis.
While model 5 suggests that one unit increase in the score of negative aﬀect raises
the amount oﬀered by 0.40 TL (p-value=0.070), model 6 indicates that it raises
the amount oﬀered by 0.39 TL (p-value=0.086).
Table 20 shows the relation between being emotionally aroused and the amount
oﬀered and the diﬀerences between the eﬀect of happy and sad emotions on the
amount oﬀered. Since happy does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the amount
oﬀered as is captured in Table 18, emotion variable is expect to show an eﬀect
on the amount oﬀered in the same direction with sad variable but with a lower
magnitude and p-value. According to the model 3, as expected, people who are
emotionally aroused oﬀer 1.33 TL more than people in a neutral mood, ceteris
paribus (p − value = 0.094). We could not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the
amount oﬀered between happy and sad people .
4.3.2 Second Mover Behaviour in the Ultimatum Game
Fourth column of the Table 17 shows the mean rates of acceptance of oﬀers made
by the ﬁrst players and compares them across treatments. While 71% of the oﬀers
in the Neutral treatment are accepted, it is 71% in the Happy treatment and
82% in the Sad treatment. Both the Wilcoxon test and the t-test cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the rate of acceptance is similar across treatments. If we
would only consider the Ultimatum Game to analyse the motives behind the second
movers’ behaviour, we would not support Hypothesis 4.1 and Hypothesis 4.2 which
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Table 21: Probit Analysis: The eﬀect of Happy/Positive Aﬀect on the Acceptance
Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Happy -0.001 -0.02 - -
[0.992] [0.892]
Positive Aﬀect - - 0.03 0.03
[0.578] [0.596]
Amount Oﬀered 0.06 0.065 0.04 0.04
[0.013**] [0.011**] [0.049**] [0.056*]
Age - 0.04 - 0.02
[0.261] [0.250]
Male - -0.03 - 0.13
[0.832] [0.197]
Consumption - 0.00007 - 0.00004
[0.565] [0.468]
# of Econ classes -0.02 - -0.002
[0.227] [0.860]
Notes: 1 with respect to 1 (never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05;
*** p ≤ 0.01.
state that sad people negatively reciprocate less than people in a neutral and a
happy mood. Table 21 shows that the eﬀect of happy and positive emotions
on the probability of accepting the oﬀers. We could not ﬁnd any evidence to
support Hypothesis 4.3 Neither happy nor positive aﬀects statistically change the
acceptance behaviour which is considered as negative reciprocity in the Ultimatum
Game.
Table 22 represents that the eﬀect of sad and negative emotions on the ac-
ceptance behaviour of the second players. The results of probit regression do not
detect a signiﬁcant relation between those emotions and the probability of accept-
ing the oﬀer. Since neither sad nor happy have a statistically signiﬁcant relation
between them, we do not expect to have an eﬀect of being emotional aroused and a
diﬀerence between happy and sad emotions. Results are represented in Table 23.
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Table 22: Probit Analysis: The eﬀect of Sad/Negative Aﬀect on the Acceptance
Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sad 0.02 0.04 - -
[0.852] [0.716]
Negative Aﬀect - - -0.002 -0.001
[0.957] [0.975]
Amount Oﬀered 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
[0.205] [0.210] [0.041**] [0.049**]
Age - -0.005 - 0.016
[0.752] [0.253]
Male - 0.17 - 0.13
[0.105] [0.185]
Consumption - 0.0000 - 0.00004
[0.917] [0.496]
# of Econ classes - 0.02 - -0.003
[0.112] [0.779]
Notes: 1 with respect to 1 (never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05;
*** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 23: Probit Analysis: The eﬀect of Being Emotionally Aroused on the Ac-
ceptance Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emotion1 0.009 -0.004 - -
[0.931] [0.974]
Happy vs Sad2 - - -0.05 -0.05
[0.654] [0.618]
Amount Oﬀered 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
[0.054*] [0.061*] [0.162] [0.124]
Age - 0.02 - 0.02
[0.242] [0.170]
Male - 0.13 - 0.2
[0.187] [0.045**]
Consumption - 0.00004 - 0.0001
[0.501] [0.258]
# of Econ classes - -0.003 - -0.004
[0.786] [0.704]
Notes: 1 Emotion is a dummy variable which takes 0 (zero) if subject is in the
Neutral treatment and takes 1 (one) if subject is either in the Happy treatment or
in the Sad treatment. 2 with respect to 1 (never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10;
** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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As expected, being emotionally aroused does not change the acceptance behaviour
statistically. Also, we could not ﬁnd any statistical diﬀerence in the acceptance
behaviour of second players between subjects in the Happy treatment and subjects
in the Sad treatment. As we only consider the Ultimatum Game without to anal-
yse second mover behaviour, we would not support Hypothesis 4.1 and Hypothesis
4.2 which state that sad people negatively reciprocate less than people in a neutral
and a happy mood.
4.3.3 First Mover Behaviour in the Triadic Design - Ultimatum Game
Our experimental design allows us to separate fear of rejection from altruism or
inequality aversion. A ﬁrst mover in the Ultimatum game propose generously be-
cause of two reasons: fear of rejection and altruism/inequality aversion. She may
be afraid of the fact that low oﬀers are rejected by the second player and both of
them end up with zero payoﬀ. Also, she/he may want to divide the pie into two
almost equal parts because she has an altruistic or inequality averse preference.
Analysing only the behaviour of ﬁrst movers in the Ultimatum Game do not pro-
vide a clear distinction between these two motives. That is why, we add a Dictator
Control Game which we call the Oﬀer Control Game. In the control game, ﬁrst
players can oﬀer any allocation, but, on the contrary to the Ultimatum Game,
second players cannot accept or reject this allocation. This allocation directly de-
termine their payoﬀs. In Table 24, we use a two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test and a one-tailed paired-samples t-test to compare the amount
oﬀered in the Ultimatum with the amount oﬀered in the Transfer Control Game.
Both tests conclude that the amount oﬀered in the Ultimatum is statistically sig-
niﬁcantly higher than the amount sent in the Oﬀer Control Game in the Neutral,
Happy and Sad Treatments. In other words, we ﬁnd that subjects in each treat-
ments are motivated by the fear of rejection rather than unconditional altruism.
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Table 24: Comparison of Fear of Rejection and Negative Reciprocity within Treat-
ment - Triadic Experimental Design
Treatment Neutral Tr. Happy Tr. Sad Tr.
Wilcoxon test1
Oﬀer vs Oﬀer Control z=3.43
[0.0006***]
z=3.21
[0.001***]
z=2.20
[0.028**]
Oﬀer vs PC Oﬀer z=3.38
[0.0007***]
z=4.04
[0.0001***]
z=5.09
[0.000***]
Accept vs Accept Control z=2.34
[0.025**]
z=2.53
[0.011**]
z=3.36
[0.0008***]
t-test2
Oﬀer vs Oﬀer Control t=5.35
[0.000***]
t=3.72
[0.0006***]
t=2.75
[0.005***]
Oﬀer vs PC Oﬀer t=5.67
[0.000***]
t=6.50
[0.000***]
t=6.50
[0.000***]
Accept vs Accept Control t=2.56
[0.01**]
t=2.89
[0.004***]
t=4.04
[0.0001***]
Notes: 1 Denotes a two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. 2 Denotes
a one-tailed paired-samples t-test. p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05;
*** p ≤ 0.01.
Unlikely to the results of Cox and Deck (2006), our results provide an evidence for
the existence of fear of rejection in the triadic-design experiments.
Next, in Table 25, we employ two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test and one-
tailed t-test to compare fear of rejection across treatments. In the ﬁrst column,
oﬀer mean represents the mean value of amount oﬀered in the Ultimatum Game
and its diﬀerence across treatments while oﬀer control mean represent the mean
value of amount sent in the Oﬀer Control Game. Third column of Table 25 shows
the mean value of the amount oﬀered in the Ultimatum Game minus the amount
oﬀered in the Oﬀer Control Game. If this diﬀerence is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across
treatments, then fear of rejection changes with emotions. According to the results
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Table 25: Comparison of Fear of Rejection and Inequality Aversion Across
Treatments- Triadic Experimental Design
Treatment Offer
Mean
Offer
Con-
trol
Mean
Difference
Offer
Mean1
Accept
Mean
PC
Offer
Mean
Accept
Con-
trol
Mean
Neutral Tr. 9.28 3.89 5.39 0.72 4.67 0.44
(0.66) (0.94) (1.01) (0.11) (0.31) (0.12)
Happy Tr. 9.46 5.25 4.21 0.71 3.71 0.37
(0.94) (1.21) (1.131) (0.09) (0.39) (0.101)
Sad Tr. 10.91 8.94 1.97 0.82 3.59 0.44
(0.47) (0.68) (0.72) (0.07) (0.30) (0.09)
Wilcoxon
test2
Neutral vs
Happy
z=0.052 z=-0.30 z=0.36 z=0.10 z=1.64 z=0.45
[0.958] [0.767] [0.721] [0.922] [0.101] [0.654]
Neutral vs Sad z=-2.15 z=-3.67 z=2.74 z=-0.84 z=2.10 z=0.02
[0.031**] [0.0002***][0.006***] [0.40] [0.036**] [0.982]
Sad vs Happy z=2.34 z=3.30 z=-2.42 z=1.03 z=-0.20 z=-0.5
[0.025**] [0.001***] [0.0156**] [0.304] [0.841] [0.617]
t-test3
Neutral vs
Happy
t=-0.16 t=-0.89 t=0.78 t=0.10 t=1.92 t=0.44
[0.438] [0.190] [0.22] [0.462] [0.031**] [0.331]
Neutral vs Sad t=-2.01 t=-4.36 t=2.77 t=-0.80 t=2.48 t=0.02
[0.025**] [0.0001***][0.004***] [0.216] [0.008***] [0.491]
Sad vs Happy t=1.38 t=2.66 t=-1.67 t=0.10 t=-0.24 t=0.50
[0.087*] [0.005***] [0.051*] [0.162] [0.404] [0.310]
Notes: 1 is the amount oﬀered in the Ultimatum Game minus the amount oﬀered
in the Oﬀer Control Game. 2 Denotes a two-tailed Wilcoxon Rank-sum test. 3
Denotes a one-tailed t-test with unequal variances. Standard errors in paranthesis.
p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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of both test, subjects in the Sad treatment are signiﬁcantly less motivated by the
fear of rejection than subjects in the Neutral Treatment (Wilcoxon: z = 2.74;
p − value = 0.006, t-test: t = 2.77; p − value = 0.04) and subjects in the Happy
treatment (Wilcoxon: z = −2.42; p−value = 0.0156, t-test: t = −1.67; p−value =
0.051). Therefore, these results support Hypothesis 3.1 and Hypothesis 3.2 which
state that sad people are less motivated by the fear of rejection than people in
a neutral and in a happy mood. The exactly opposite results of the Ultimatum
Game and the triadic design Ultimatum Game is because of the fact that while our
experimental design diﬀerentiates between the altruism and the fear of rejection,
the Ultimatum Game interprets these two motives as the fear of rejection.
4.3.4 Second Mover Behaviour in the Triadic Design - Ultimatum
Game
Our experimental design also allows us to separate negative reciprocity from other
preferences. A second player in the Ultimatum Game rejects the ﬁrst player’s low
oﬀer because of two possible reasons: inequality aversion and negative reciprocity.
The second player may think that the ﬁrst player divides the pie unequally, there-
fore, he/she reject the oﬀer. On the other hand, she/he may want to punish the
second player because the ﬁrst player oﬀers low amount for her/him. In order to
diﬀerentiate between negative reciprocity and inequality aversion, we add a con-
trol game which is called the Accept Control Game. This control game diﬀers
from the Ultimatum Game in one aspect. In the Accept Control Game, computer
randomly generates an allocation for each subject pairs. Then, the second players
are informed about the allocation and asked to decide whether to accept or reject
this oﬀer. In this control game, ﬁrst player do not have any power to aﬀect the
computer’s oﬀer. If the second player rejects the low oﬀer in the Ultimatum Game,
but accepts statistically same oﬀer in the Accept Control Game, then she/he is
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motivated by the negative reciprocity.
Table 24 also compares the rate of acceptance in the Ultimatum Game and
in the Accept Control Game by using Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test
and a one-tailed paired-samples t-test. Both of them ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the acceptance behaviour in the Ultimatum Game and in the Accept
Control Game. However, the distribution of amount oﬀered for the second player in
the Ultimatum Game signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the computer’s oﬀer for the second
player in the Oﬀer Control Game. As a result of statistically diﬀerent oﬀers in
these two games, we are not able to interpret the signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the acceptance behaviour in the Ultimatum Game and in the Accept Control
game as the negative reciprocity. Therefore, we cannot support Hypothesis 4.1
and Hypothesis 4.2 which state that sad people negatively reciprocate less than
people in a neutral and a happy mood. On the other hand, high rejection rates
in the Accept Control Game guide us to consider the motive behind the second
movers’ behaviour as the inequality aversion.
In order to determine whether inequality aversion diﬀers across treatments, we
employ another analysis on our data. In the ﬁfth column of Table 25, mean
values of computer’s oﬀers are reported and compared across treatments. The
mean value of computer’s oﬀer in the Sad treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than
in the Neutral treatment and in the Happy treatment. In the sixth column, mean
values of rate of acceptance of computer’s oﬀers are shown and compared across
treatments. There is not statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the rate of acceptance
between treatments. Since the mean value of computer’s oﬀers in the Happy and
Sad treatments are statistically below the mean value of computer’s oﬀer in the
Neutral treatment, we are not able to compare the degree of inequality aversion
between treatments. However, if we assume that the diﬀerences in PC oﬀers
between treatments are small, we would conclude that consistent to our previous
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Table 26: Probit Analysis: The eﬀect of Happy/Positive Aﬀect on the Acceptance
Behavior - The Accept Control Game
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Happy -0.02 -0.02 - -
[0.911] [0.905]
Positive Aﬀect - - -0.09 -0.09
[0.157] [0.161]
PC Oﬀer 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07
[0.232] [0.293] [0.048**] [0.037**]
Age - -0.02 - 0.02
[0.458] [0.301]
Male - -0.20 - 0.03
[0.230] [0.800]
Consumption - 0.0001 - 0.0001
[0.453] [0.049**]
# of Econ classes 0.006 - -0.01
[0.770] [0.329]
Notes: 1 with respect to 1 (never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05;
*** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 27: Probit Analysis: The eﬀect of Sad/Negative Aﬀect on the Acceptance
Behavior - the Accept Control Game
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sad 0.09 -0.03 - -
[0.544] [0.881]
Negative Aﬀect - - 0.02 0.008
[0.621] [0.980]
PC Oﬀer 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
[0.051*] [0.072*] [0.029**] [0.026]
Age - 0.04 - 0.02
[0.117] [0.308]
Male - 0.09 - 0.02
[0.551] [0.853]
Consumption - 0.0002 - 0.0001
[0.017**] [0.045**]
# of Econ classes - -0.03 - -0.01
[0.147] [0.443]
Notes: 1 with respect to 1 (never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05;
*** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 28: Probit Analysis: The eﬀect of Being Emotionally Aroused on the Ac-
ceptance Behavior - the Accept Control Game
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emotion1 0.05 -0.02 - -
[0.742] [0.871]
Sad vs Happy2 - - -0.08 -0.05
[0.540] [0.737]
PC Oﬀer 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
[0.03**] [0.036**] [0.032**] [0.038**]
Age - 0.02 - 0.03
[0.296] [0.151]
Male - 0.02 - 0.08
[0.854] [0.530]
Consumption - 0.00001 - 0.0001
[0.041**] [0.125]
# of Econ classes - -0.01 - -0.004
[0.442] [0.795]
Notes: 1 Emotion is a dummy variable which takes 0 (zero) if subject is in the
Neutral treatment and takes 1 (one) if subject is either in the Happy treatment or
in the Sad treatment. 2 with respect to 1 (never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10;
** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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analysis on inequality-aversion in Section 4.2.4, inequality aversion does not depend
on one’s emotional state. To further analyse the eﬀect of emotions on inequality
aversion, we run a regression. The results of Table 26 shows that happy and
positive emotions do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the acceptance behaviour in
the Accept Control Game. Table 27 shows the same analysis for sad and negative
emotions. The results also do not report any signiﬁcant relation. Since both happy
and sad variable do not have a signiﬁcant impact on the probability of accepting
the computer’s oﬀer, the results of Table 28 also do not report a statistically
signiﬁcant relation. Therefore, we cannot support Hypothesis 6.1 and Hypothesis
6.2 which states that sad people are more inequality-averse than people in a neutral
and happy mood.
4.4 Altruism
4.4.1 Altruism Towards a Charitable Organization
In order to observe the altruistic behaviour towards a charitable organization,
subjects are asked to donate a part or none of their endowments to the LÖSEV
which helps children with leukaemia. Figure 6 shows the frequency of the given
amount of donation across treatments. While 18.18% of the subjects in the Neutral
treatment donate zero amount, it is 4.17% in the Happy treatment and 5.88% in
the Sad treatment. On the other hand, 37.5% of subjects in the Happy treatment
donate all of their money while 22.73% of the subjects in the Neutral treatment
and 20.59% of the subjects in the Sad treatment donate all of their endowments.
Table 29 reports the mean values of donation made in each treatments and
its diﬀerence across treatments. In the Neutral treatment, the mean of donation
is 12.27 while 17.87 in the Happy treatment and 19.18 in the Sad treatment.
In order to observe whether the amount of donation statistically diﬀers across
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Figure 6: Donation Across Treatments
Table 29: Comparison of Altruism Across Treatments
Treatment Donation Mean Wilcoxon Rank-sum1 t-test2
Neutral Tr. 12.27 - -
(2.33)
Happy Tr. 17.87 - -
(2.11)
Sad Tr. 19.18 - -
(1.48)
Neutral vs Happy - z=-0.761 t=-0.83
- [0.446] [0.206]
Neutral vs Sad - z=-1.296 t=-1.41
- [0.195] [0.083*]
Sad vs Happy - z=0.586 t=0.51
- [0.558] [0.308]
Notes: 1 Denotes a two-tailed Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test. 2 Denotes a one tailed
t-test. Standard errors in parentheses. p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; **
p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 30: Regression Analysis: The eﬀect of Sad/Negative Aﬀect on the Amount
of Donation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
without
control
variables
without
control
variables
Sad 3.90 4.17 4.56 - - -
[0.162] [0.119] [0.081*]
Negative Aﬀect - - - 0.73 0.80 0.67
[0.241] [0.173] [0.262]
Age - 1.08 1.28 - 0.93 1.10
[0.001***][0.000***] [0.000***][0.000***]
Male - -2.29 -0.99 - -3.71 -2.81
[0.323] [0.664] [0.07*] [0.181]
Consumption - -0.003 -0.003 - -0.003 -0.003
[0.007***][0.008***] [0.025**] [0.038**]
# of Econ
classes
- - -0.49 - - -0.52
[0.025**] [0.01***]
Extreme Sports1
2 (one or two
times)
- - 4.14 - - 2.34
[0.137] [0.318]
3 (occasionally) - - -0.32 - - -1.32
[0.934] [0.646]
4 (often) - - -3.61 - - -2.86
[0.454] [0.508]
5 (every chance) - - -15.62 - - -13.65
[0.000***] [0.000***]
Constant 15.27 -2.09 –7.43 15.65 1.04 -2.06
[0.000***] [0.760] [0.331] [0.000***] [0.859] [0.456]
Notes: 1 with respect to 1 (never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05;
*** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 31: Regression Analysis: The eﬀect of Happy Emotion/Positive Aﬀect on
the Amount of Donation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
without
control
variables
without
control
variables
Happy 2.60 1.20 1.71 - - -
[0.412] [0.674] [0.570]
Positive Aﬀect - - - 0.48 0.51 0.13
[0.691] [0.665] [0.912]
Age - 0.48 0.91 - 0.94 1.11
[0.216] [0.028**] [0.000***][0.000***]
Male - -7.14 -5.85 - -3.89 -2.95
[0.032**] [0.132] [0.057*] [0.169]
Consumption - -0.002 -0.002 - -0.002 -0.002
[0.209] [0.217] [0.055*] [0.060*]
# of Econ
classes
- - -0.91 - - -0.53
[0.005***] [0.019**]
Extreme Sports1
2 (one or two
times)
- - -1.76 - - 2.47
[0.643] [0.293]
3 (occasionally) - - -4.95 - - -1.29
[0.194] [0.664]
4 (often) - - -1.30 - - -2.52
[0.749] [0.556]
5 (every chance I
get)
- - - - -13.93
[0.000***]
Constant 15.27 12.77 6.36 16.31 1.21 -1.11
[0.000***] [0.197] [0.551] [0.000***] [0.870] [0.882]
Notes: 1 with respect to 1 (never). p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05;
*** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 32: Regression Analysis: The eﬀect of Being Emotionally Aroused on the
Amount of Donation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Emotion1 3.37 2.80 3.24 - - -
[0.202] [0.254] [0.178]
Happy vs Sad2 - - - -1.30 -2.65 -3.02
[0.614] [0.304] [0.241]
Age - 0.91 1.07 - 1.03 1.08
[0.000***][0.000***] [0.000***][0.000***]
Male - -3.58 -2.56 - -2.81 -2.06
[0.077*] [0.210] [0.226] [0.393]
Consumption - -0.003 -0.003 - -0.003 -0.002
[0.021**] [0.025**] [0.087*] [0.159]
# of Econ
classes
- - -0.53 - - -0.41
[0.011***] [0.095*]
Extreme Sports2
2 (one or two
times)
- - 2.25 - - 1.88
[0.332] [0.476]
3 (occasionally) - - -1.99 - - -0.64
[0.500] [0.840]
4 (often) - - -3.03 - - -4.02
[0.472] [0.487]
5 (every chance) - - -15.26 - - -16.64
[0.000***] [0.000***]
Constant 15.27 1.58 -1.73 19.18 2.41 1.33
[0.000***] [0.796] [0.793] [0.000***] [0.719] [0.858]
Notes: 1 Emotion is a dummy variable which takes 0 (zero) if subject is in the
Neutral treatment and takes 1 (one) if subject is either in the Happy treatment
or in the Sad treatment. 2 with respect to 1 (never). p-values in brackets. *
p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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treatments, we employ a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test and one-tailed t-test
with unequal variances. According to the Wilcoxon test, the distribution of the
donation variable is statistically same in all treatments. However, t-test reports
that the mean value of donation is signiﬁcantly higher in the Sad treatment than
in the Neutral treatment (t = −1.41; p − value = 0.083). This result supports
Hypothesis 5.1 which states that sad people behave more altruistically than people
in a neutral mood.
Table 30 shows the eﬀect of sad and negative emotions on the amount donated.
First three models include sad variable which takes 1 if the data comes from the
Sad treatment and takes 0 (zero) if it comes from the Neutral treatment. Last
three models include negative aﬀect variable which is the average of the scores of
following adjectives: sad, angry, fearful and anxious. When there is not any control
variable in the regression, being sad does not lead to a change in the amount
of donation (p − value = 0.162). In model 2, sad variable is still insigniﬁcant
(p − value = 0.119) but age and consumption have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the amount of donation. Model 3 suggests that sad people donate 4.58 TL more
than people in the neutral mood (p-value=0.081). This result is also in favour of
Hypothesis 5.1 which states that sad people behave more altruistically than people
in a neutral mood. In addition, model 3, 4 and 5 do not report any signiﬁcant
relation between negative aﬀect and the amount of donation.
The same regression models as in Table 30 are replicated in Table 31 but sad
is replaced with happy variable and negative aﬀect is replaced with positive aﬀect
variable. Neither of the models in Table 31 provide a signiﬁcant eﬀect of happy and
positive emotions. Thus, Hypothesis 5.3 which states that happy people behave
less altruistically than people in a neutral mood is not supported.
Finally, we examine the eﬀect of being emotionally aroused and the diﬀerence
between being happy and being sad on the amount of donation in Table 32.
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According the result of regression models, we could not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant dif-
ference between the amount donated by happy people and sad people. Therefore,
Hypothesis 5.2 is not supported.
4.4.2 Comparison of Altruistic Preferences in Different Contexts
Apart from the Dictator Game that subjects donate a part or none of their endow-
ments to a charitable organization, triadic design Trust Game and triadic design
Ultimatum Game have also the Dictator Game component. Main diﬀerence be-
tween them is that in the control games, they play this game with a person as an
opponent. Both the Transfer Control Game and the Oﬀer Control Game represent
altruistic preferences because ﬁrst players are asked to send an amount to their
partners while their partners do not have a chance to respond the ﬁrst players’
actions. The second column of Table 16 represents the mean amount sent in the
Transfer Control Game. According to the both Wilcoxon rank-sum test and t-test,
subjects in the sad treatment transfer signiﬁcantly more money to their partners
than subjects in the Neutral treatment (Wilcoxon: z = −1.99 ; p − value=0.046,
t-test: t = −1.93 ; p−value = 0.030). In addition, the second column of Table 17
shows the mean amount oﬀered in the Oﬀer Control Game. Both Wilcoxon test
and t-test reports that subjects in the Sad treatment oﬀer signiﬁcantly more money
than subject in the Neutral treatment (Wilcoxon: z = −3.67 ; p − value=0.0002,
t-test: t = −4.36 ; p − value = 0.0001) and in the Happy treatment (Wilcoxon:
z = 3.30 ; p − value=0.001, t-test: t = 2.66 ; p − value = 0.005). All of our ﬁnd-
ings support Hypothesis 5.1 which states that sad people behave more altruistically
than people in a neutral mood.
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Table 33: Order of Games
Order 1 Order 2
First Game the Investment Game the Ultimatum Game
Second Game the Ultimatum Game the Investment Game
Third Game the Dictator Game the Dictator Game
# of observa-
tions
46 30
Table 34: Comparison of Trust and Positive Reciprocity within Treatment - Triadic
Experimental Design - only First Round
Treatment Neutral Tr. Happy Tr. Sad Tr.
Wilcoxon test1
Transfer vs Transfer Con-
trol
z=2.53
[0.011**]
z=1.71
[0.086*]
z=2.63
[0.008***]
Return vs Return Control z=-1.72
[0.085*]
z=-0.42
[0.672]
z=-1.35
[0.176]
t-test2
Transfer vs Transfer Con-
trol
t=4.21
[0.002***]
t=1.59
[0.066*]
t=3.13
[0.002***]
Return vs Return Control t=-1.62
[0.075*]
t=-0.85
[0.204]
t=-0.53
[0.301]
Notes: 1 Denotes a two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. 2 Denotes
a one-tailed paired-samples t-test. p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05;
*** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 35: Comparison of Trust and Positive Reciprocity Across Treatments - Tri-
adic Experimental Design - only First Round
Treatment Transfer
Mean
Transfer
Con-
trol
Mean
Difference
Trans-
fer
Mean1
Return
Mean
Return
Con-
trol
Mean
Difference
Return
Mean2
Neutral Tr. 5 1.87 3.13 5.87 7.37 -1.5
(0.982) (0.833) (0.742) (1.288) (1.64) (0.926)
Happy Tr. 3.88 2.5 1.38 3.75 4.81 -1.06
(0.694) (0.790) (0.865) (0.772) (1.77) (1.25)
Sad Tr. 5.36 3 2.82 9.10 9.86 -0.77
(0.737) (0.505) (0.755) (2.08) (1.89) (1.46)
Wilcoxon
test3
Neutral vs
Happy
z=1.11 z=-0.47 z=1.27 z=1.42 z=-1.58 z=-0.92
[0.266] [0.636] [0.204] [0.156] [0.114] [0.356]
Neutral vs Sad z=0.05 z=-1.40 z=1.06 z=-0.19 z=-0.24 z=-0.24
[0.962] [0.160] [0.287] [0.850] [0.813] [0.806]
Sad vs Happy z=1.27 z=1.34 z=0.36 z=1.68 z=2.07 z=-0.56
[0.203] [0.181] [0.721] [0.093*] [0.039**] [0.576]
t-test4
Neutral vs
Happy
t=0.935 t=-0.54 t=1.53 t=1.41 t=1.06 t=-0.28
[0.182] [0.296] [0.069*] [0.090*] [0.150] [0.390]
Neutral vs Sad t=-0.30 t=-1.15 t=-0.72 t=-1.32 t=-0.99 t=-0.42
[0.0.385] [0.133] [0.239] [0.099*] [0.164] [0.338]
Sad vs Happy t=1.46 t=0.53 t=0.86 t=2.41 t=1.95 t=0.151
[0.075*] [0.299] [0.198] [0.011**] [0.030**] [0.440]
Notes: 1 is the amount sent in the Investment Game minus the amount sent in
the Transfer Control Game. 2 is the amount returned in the Investment Game
minus the amount returned in the Return Control Game. 3 Denotes a two-tailed
Wilcoxon Rank-sum test. 4 Denotes a one-tailed t-test with unequal variances.
Standard errors in paranthesis. p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; ***
p ≤ 0.01.
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4.5 Order Effect Analysis
Since we induce incidental emotions on subjects, we are aware that their eﬀects
are temporary. A lot of evidence in emotion research has showed that emotions
could lose their impacts on behaviour in later rounds ( see, for example: Colosante,
Marini & Russo, 2017). In order to see whether their eﬀects disappear in a time,
we also report the statistics for the subjects who play the given game in the ﬁrst
order separately. Table 33 reports the orders in which subjects play the games.
Table 34 shows the existence of trust and positive reciprocity within treat-
ments, but, it only analyses the data which comes from the subjects who play
the Trust Game in the ﬁrst round. In addition to previous results, it supports
the existence of inequality-aversion in the Neutral treatment (Wilcoxon: z =
−1.72; p − value = 0.058, t-test: t = −1.62; p − value = 0.075).
Table 35 compares the eﬀect of emotions on trust and positive reciprocity.
Diﬀerent from our ﬁrst analysis, we ﬁnd an evidence to support Hypothesis 1.3
which states that happy people trust less than people in a neutral mood ( t = 1.53;
p − value = 0.069).
Table 36 shows the existence of fear of rejection and positive reciprocity within
treatments, but, it only analyses the data which comes from the subjects who play
the Ultimatum Game in the ﬁrst round. Table 37 compares the eﬀect of emotions
on fear of rejection and negative reciprocity. When we compare the result of Table
36 and Table 37 with Table 24 and Table 17, respectively, we could not ﬁnd any
extra signiﬁcant eﬀect other than we reported above.
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Table 36: Comparison of Fear of Rejection and Negative Reciprocity within Treat-
ment - Triadic Experimental Design - First Round
Treatment Neutral Tr. Happy Tr. Sad Tr.
Wilcoxon test1
Oﬀer vs Oﬀer Control z=2.36
[0.018**]
z=2.52
[0.012**]
z=1.62
[0.105]
Oﬀer vs PC Oﬀer z=2.66
[0.008***]
z=2.53
[0.011**]
z=3.03
[0.002***]
Accept vs Accept Control z=1.73
[0.083*]
z=1.89
[0.059*]
z=1.73
[0.083*]
t-test2
Oﬀer vs Oﬀer Control t=3.44
[0.004***]
t=4.35
[0.002***]
t=1.71
[0.057*]
Oﬀer vs PC Oﬀer t=4.39
[0.001***]
t=6.79
[0.0001***]
t=7.53
[0.0000***]
Accept vs Accept Control t=1.96
[0.041**]
t=2.38
[0.025**]
t=1.92
[0.041**]
Notes: 1 Denotes a two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. 2 Denotes
a one-tailed paired-samples t-test. p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05;
*** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 37: Comparison of Fear of Rejection and Inequality Aversion Across
Treatments- Triadic Experimental Design - First Round
Treatment Offer
Mean
Offer
Con-
trol
Mean
Difference
Offer
Mean1
Accept
Mean
PC
Offer
Mean
Accept
Con-
trol
Mean
Neutral Tr. 9.3 4.1 5.2 0.6 4.9 0.3
(0.77) (1.59) (1.51) (0.231) (0.43) (0.15)
Happy Tr. 10.5 4.25 6.25 0.75 4.25 0.13
(0.85) (1.50) (1.44) (0.164) (0.53) (0.125)
Sad Tr. 11.17 9 2.17 0.67 2.92 0.42
(1.11) (1.19) (1.27) (0.142) (0.53) (0.15)
Wilcoxon
test2
Neutral vs
Happy
z=-1.42 z=-0.23 z=-0.58 z=-0.65 z=1.25 z=0.862
[0.156] [0.821] [0.562] [0.515] [0.212] [0.389]
Neutral vs Sad z=-1.72 z=-2.26 z=-
0.316
z=-
0.553
z=2.48 z=1.47
[0.086*] [0.024**] [0.141] [0.752] [0.013**] [0.580]
Sad vs Happy z=0.53 z=2.32 z=-2.22 z=-0.39 z=-1.50 z=1.36
[0.597] [0.020**] [0.027**] [0.698] [0.135] [0.174]
t-test3
Neutral vs
Happy
t=-1.05 t=-0.07 t=-0.50 t=-0.65 t=1.92 t=0.89
[0.155] [0.473] [0.310] [0.262] [0.031**] [0.193]
Neutral vs Sad t=-1.38 t=-2.46 t=1.54 t=-0.31 t=2.48 t=-0.55
[0.092*] [0.012**] [0.070*] [0.381] [0.008***] [0.295]
Sad vs Happy t=0.48 t=2.48 t=-2.13 t=-0.38 t=-0.24 t=1.50
[0.320] [0.012**] [0.024**] [0.353] [0.404] [0.074*]
Notes: 1 is the amount oﬀered in the Ultimatum Game minus the amount oﬀered
in the Oﬀer Control Game. 2 Denotes a two-tailed Wilcoxon Rank-sum test. 3
Denotes a one-tailed t-test with unequal variances. Standard errors in parenthesis.
p-values in brackets. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
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5 Conclusion
The self-interest hypothesis assumes that individuals care only their own payoﬀs.
Their choices do not depend on other people’s utility and the context in which
they decide. However, the evidence presented in this paper also supports the ex-
isting literature on the existence of other-regarding preferences. Individuals trust
in positive reciprocity, fear of negative reciprocity, respond the kind behavior with
kind actions and punish the bad behavior even they all result in lower payoﬀ for
theirselves. Our main result suggests that emotions also result in a change in
individuals’ behaviour and it provides a useful tool for predicting the actions of
agents. Social preferences are not stable with respect to emotions. Therefore, a
simple perturbation of the environment would aﬀect people’s preferences. Speciﬁ-
cally, we supported Hypothesis 3.1 and Hypothesis 3.2 which state that sad people
are less motivated by the fear of rejection than happy people and than people in
a neutral mood. We also supported Hypothesis 5.1 which states that sad people
behave more altruistically than people in a neutral mood. A plausible explanation
for these might be that good behaviour help sad people to recover their mood
(Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976). Also, we ﬁnd an evidence to support that happy peo-
ple trust less than people in a neutral mood when we analyse only the data which
comes from subjects who play the Trust Game before the others.
Since we put experimental limitations on the data, we also estimated Tobit
models to make sure that non-linearity does not change our results. The results
are similar to the main results we report above. Our research project provides an
important tool for modeling and predicting the actions of economic agents. Since
we show in Section 4 that diﬀerent emotions have distinct eﬀects on social prefer-
ences, it provides a systematic relation between emotions and decision making.
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Appendix A
Emotional Arousal Survey
Film Clips 1
Please answer following questions according to the First Movie Clip you watched.
Did you watch/heard this movie before?
Yes / No
Please rate the following statement: While I was watching the film,
(1)“I felt no emotions at all” to (7)“I felt very intense emotions”.
1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7
For each group of adjectives below, please rate the extent to which you
felt each state as you were watching the film clip. (1“not at all”, 7“very
intense”)
Interested, concentrated, alert ______________
Joyful, happy, amused ______________
Sad, down-hearted, blue ______________
Angry,irritated, mad ______________
Fearful, scared, afraid ______________
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Anxious, tense, nervous ______________
Disgusted, turned off, repulsed ______________
Disdainful, scornful, contemptuous ______________
Suprised, amazed, astonished ______________
Warm hearted, gleeful, elated ______________
Film Clips 2
Please answer following questions according to the Second Movie Clip you watched.
Did you watch/heard this movie before?
Yes / No
Please rate the following statement: While I was watching the film,
(1)“I felt no emotions at all” to (7)“I felt very intense emotions”.
1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7
For each group of adjectives below, please rate the extent to which you
felt each state as you were watching the film clip. (1“not at all”, 7“very
intense”)
Interested, concentrated, alert ______________
Joyful, happy, amused ______________
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Sad, down-hearted, blue ______________
Angry,irritated, mad ______________
Fearful, scared, afraid ______________
Anxious, tense, nervous ______________
Disgusted, turned off, repulsed ______________
Disdainful, scornful, contemptuous ______________
Suprised, amazed, astonished ______________
Warm hearted, gleeful, elated ______________
Film Clips 3
Please answer following questions according to Last Movie Clip you watched.
Did you watch/heard this movie before?
Yes / No
Please rate the following statement: While I was watching the film,
(1)“I felt no emotions at all” to (7)“I felt very intense emotions”.
1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7
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For each group of adjectives below, please rate the extent to which you
felt each state as you were watching the film clip. (1“not at all”, 7“very
intense”)
Interested, concentrated, alert ______________
Joyful, happy, amused ______________
Sad, down-hearted, blue ______________
Angry,irritated, mad ______________
Fearful, scared, afraid ______________
Anxious, tense, nervous ______________
Disgusted, turned off, repulsed ______________
Disdainful, scornful, contemptuous ______________
Surprised, amazed, astonished ______________
Warm hearted, gleeful, elated ______________
Is there any scene that oﬀends you? If yes, belong to which ﬁlm? Explain why
does it oﬀend you.
No / Film 1 /Film 2 / Film 3 __________________________________________
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General Questionnaire
Thank you very much for participating in our decision experiment. We would like
to ask you a few questions. Your privacy is protected because your name will not
appear on this questionnaire or on your decision tables. Your personal information
is not shared with any other party. It is conﬁdential. Please answer the questions
below carefully.
1. What is your gender?
Male / Female
2. What is your age?
3. Are you now employed full-time, part-time, not employed, or retired?
Full time / Part-time / Not employed / Retired
4. Approximately, how much money you consume in a month?
5. Which best describes where you currently live?
Dorm / Oﬀ-campus housing / Living at home with family
6. What is your marital status?
Single / In a relationship / Married / Separated / Divorced / Widowed
7. How would you describe your political views?
Very conservative / Conservative / Moderate / Liberal / very liberal
8. How often do you participate in extreme sports? [Extreme sports in-
clude bungee-jumping, para-gliding, parachute jumping, gliding, rafting, diving
and other dangerous sports.]
Never / A few times / Occasionally / Often / Every chance I get
9. Class status:
English Preparation / Freshman / Sophomore / Junior / Senior / Graduate Stu-
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dent
10. What is your intended or declared area of specialization / major?
11. Your current GPA:
12. How many “Econ” coded courses have you taken (include currently en-
rolled)?
Appendix B
Talimatname
Bugünkü ekonomi deneyimize hoşgeldiniz. Bu çalışmada herhangi bir aldatmaca
veya yanıltmaca bulunmamaktadır. Deneye katılan herkes 5 lira kazanacaktır.
Ayrıca deney boyunca verdiğiniz kararlara bağlı olarak deneyin sonucunda bir mik-
tar daha para kazanabilirsiniz. Şimdi deney başlıyor. Lütfen şu andan itibaren
birbirinizle konuşmayınız, cep telefonlarını kullanmayınız ve bilgisayarlardan açılı
olan ekran dışına çıkmayınız. Kuralların herhangi birine uyulmaması durumunda
deney sonucunda kazanacağınız paradan men edileceksiniz. Çalışmanın birinci
kısmında, sizlere 3’er dakikalık 3 farklı ﬁlmden alınmış ﬁlm kesitleri izleteceğiz.
İkinci kısımda ise sizden 9 farklı soruya yanıt vermenizi isteyeceğiz. Bu soruların
doğru veya yanlış cevabı yoktur. Sorularla ilgili açıklamayı bilgisayar ekranında
göreceksiniz. Lütfen verilen açıklamaları dikkatlice okuyun. Deneyin sonunda
bu sorulardan bir tanesi rastgele seçilip sizin ve eğer var ise o soruda eşleştiğiniz
kişinin kazanacağı paranın miktarını belirleyecektir. Her sorunun seçilme olasılığı
aynıdır. Bu yüzden lütfen kararlarınızı dikkatli veriniz. Örneğin: Soru size X li-
rayı eşleştiğiniz kişi ve kendi aranızda paylaştırmanızı istiyor. Siz y lirasını karşıya
gönderdiniz. Eğer bu task rastgele ödeme için seçilen task olur ise, deneyin sonu-
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cunda siz X-y lira kazanacaksınız. Eşleştiğiniz kişi ise y lira kazanacak. Yani sizin
verdiğiniz karar hem sizin hem de eşleştiğiniz kişinin kazanacağı miktarı etkileye-
cektir. Her soruda başka bir kişi işe eşleşeceksiniz. Bir kere eşleştiğiniz kişi ile
bir daha eşleşmeniz mümkün değildir. Ne siz eşleştiğiniz kişinin kim olduğunu
bilebilirsiniz, ne de eşleştiğiniz kişi sizin kim olduğunuzu bilebilir. Deney boyunca
verdiğiniz cevaplar anonim olarak kaydedilecektir ve asla sizin kişisel bilgileriniz
ile eşleştirilmeyecektir. Size verilen kullanıcı tanıtım kodlarıyla tanınacaksınız.
Ödemeler deneyin sonunda özel olarak yapılacaktır. Eğer deney sırasında her-
hangi bir sorunuz olur ise, sadece elinizi kaldırınız. Bir kişi size yardımcı olmak
için gelecektir.
Gönüllü Katılım Formu
Bu araştırma Sabancı Üniversitesi, SSBF Fakültesi yüksek lisans öğrencisi Ceren
Bengü Çıbık ve öğretim üyelerinden Özgür Kıbrıs sorumluluğunda karar verme
süreci ile ilgili bilgi toplamayı amaçlar. Bu çalışmada herhangi bir yanıltma veya
aldatmaca bulunmamaktadır. Araştırmaya katılım tamamıyla gönüllük esasına
dayanır. Bu çalışmaya katılan herkes otomatikman 5 lira kazanacaktır. Buna
ek olarak bu çalışma sonucunda verdiğiniz kararlara bağlı olarak da bir miktar
para kazanabilirsiniz. Katılımcının cevapları gizli tutulacak ve sadece araştırmacı
tarafından değerlendirilecektir. Katılımcının çalışma sırasında verdiği herhangi
bir cevap kendi kimlik bilgileriyle eşleştirilmeyecektir. Tüm soruların yanıtlan-
ması yaklaşık olarak 30-40 dakika sürmektedir. Çalışmaya katılımınızın çalışma
kapsamında incelenen konuya katkı sağlayacağı düşünülmektedir.Sonuçlarının yal-
nız bilimsel amaçlarla kullanılacak olan bu çalışmaya katılımınız tamamen sizin
isteğinize bağlıdır. Genel olarak çalışma kişisel rahatsızlık verecek soruları içer-
memektedir. Ancak, sorulan sorulardan ya da herhangi başka bir nedenden ötürü
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rahatsız olunması durumunda katılımcı görüşmeyi istediği zaman yarıda bırakıp
çıkmakta serbesttir. Sizden herhangi bir kimlik bilgisi alınmayacak ve vereceğiniz
bilgiler araştırmacının bilgisayarında güvenli bir şekilde saklanıp tamamen gizli
tutulacaktır. Çalışmadan elde edilen veriler grup olarak değerlendirilecektir. Bu
bilgiler sadece öğrencinin ve öğretim üyesinin araştırma projesinde ve yapacağı bil-
imsel yayınlarda kullanılacaktır. Çalışma başladığında sizlere bir takım ﬁlmlerden
kısa kesitler izleteceğiz. Bu ﬁlmler cinsel veya şiddet içerikli olabilir. Herhangi
bir nedenden dolayı rahatsızlık hissederseniz çalışmadan istediğiniz anda ve bir
neden göstermeksizin ayrılabilirsiniz. Çalışma boyunca cevaplayacağınız sorular
için doğru ya da yanlış cevap yoktur. Araştırma sonuçlarının sağlıklı olması için
soruları eksiksiz ve içtenlikle, sizi tam olarak yansıtacak şekilde cevaplamanız çok
önemlidir. Katkılarınızdan dolayı teşekkür ederim. Çalışma ile ilgili herhangi
bir sorunuz olursa veya çalışmanın sonuçlarını öğrenmek isterseniz, Ceren Bengü
Çıbık’a mail atabilirsiniz.( e-posta: cbengu@sabanciuniv.edu ) Teşekkür ederiz.
Araştırma ile ilgili yukarıda belirtilen hususları okudum ve anladım. Araştır-
maya yönelik tüm sorularım araştırmacı tarafından cevaplandı ve bana bu for-
mun imzalı bir kopyası verildi. Bu çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katılıyorum
ve istediğim zaman yarıda kesip bırakabileceğimi biliyorum. Verdiğim bilgilerin
araştırmacının master tez çalışmasında ve de bilimsel amaçlı yayınlarında kullan-
masını kabul ediyorum.
KATILIMCI :
ARAŞTIRMACI : CEREN BENGÜ ÇIBIK
Son Bilgilendirme Formu
Bugünkü çalışmamıza katıldığınız için teşekkür ederiz. Bu çalışmanın amacı farklı
duyguların karar verme sürecindeki etkisini belirleyebilmektir. Günlük yaşan-
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tılarımıza baktığımızda bireylerin sadece kendi materyal çıkarlarını değil ayrıca
bir grupta veya toplumda bulunan diğer kişilerin materyal durumlarını önemsedik-
lerini ve karar verme sürecinde de kıskançlık, sadakat, eşitlik gibi duyguları dikkate
aldıklarını görebiliriz. Mutlu olan bir insan ile kızgın veya üzgün olan bir insanın
karar verme süreçlerinin birbiriyle aynı olmadıklarını tahmin edebiliriz. Fakat
bazı zamanlar her ne kadar belli duyguların etkisinde olup bu duygularımızın kon-
trolünü sağlamaya çalışsak da bu duygularımızın kararlarımızı etkilemesini önleye-
meyebiliriz. Bunun başlıca nedeni duyguların karar verme sürecindeki etkilerini
tam olarak saptamanın zor olması olabilir. Biz bu çalışmada duyguların karar
verme sürecindeki etkilerini ekonomik olarak modellemek üzere yola çıktık. Bizim
bugünkü deneyimizde sizler mutlu / üzgün veya nötr duygulardan oluşan 3 tane
ﬁlmden parçalar izlediniz. Biz hepinize sosyal tercihlerle ilgili bazı sorular sorduk.
Bu çalışmadaki amacımız sizlerin verdiği cevaplara göre mutlu olmanın, üzgün
olmanın veya nötr duygu durumunda olmanın tanımadığınız bir kişiye iyilik yap-
mak, güven duymak ve o kişiyi ödüllendirmek / cezalandırmak gibi davranışlar
üzerindeki etkisini incelemektir. Çalışmanın sonucunda elde etmeyi beklediğimiz
sonuçlar şu şekildedir. Öncelikle duygu durumu nötr olan kişiler ile herhangi bir
duygunun etkisinde olan kişilerin davranışlarının farklılık göstermesini bekliyoruz.
Özellikle mutlu olan kişiler nötr duygu durumunda olan kişilere oranla daha çok
sosyal olarak sorumlu davranışlar sergileyeceklerdir. Üzgün duygu durumunda
olan kişiler ise nötr duygu durumda olan kişilere oranla kendilerine yapılan iyi bir
hareketi daha çok ödüllendirmelerini ve kendilerine gösterilen kötü bir davranışı
ise daha sert cezalandırmalarını bekliyoruz.
Bugünkü seansımızda topladığımız tüm veriler çalışmanın başında da belir-
tildiği gibi gizli ve güvende tutulacaktır. Sizin verdiğiniz bireysel cevaplarınızı
kişilik bilgilerinizle eşleştirmemiz mümkün değildir. Ayrıca biz kişilerin bireysel
cevaplarıyla değil, tüm cevaplar birleştirildiğindeki genel davranış şekli ile ilgilen-
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mekteyiz. Çalışmamız bu deney seansından sonra tekrarlanacağı için verilerin
gerçeği yansıttığından emin olabilmek adına çalışmanın amacını ve işleyişini lüt-
fen çalışmaya katılması muhtemel olan üçüncü kişiler ile paylaşmayınız. Eğer bir
sorunuz, endişeniz var ise veya çalışmanın sonuçlarıyla ilgili daha fazla bilgi almak
istiyorsanız araştırmacı Ceren Bengü Çıbık ile cbengu@sabanciuniv.edu e-posta
adresinden iletişime geçebilirsiniz. Yorum ve görüşlerinizi de duymaktan mutluluk
duyarız.
Bu tarzda bir ekonomik çalışma Sabancı Üniversitesi’nde ilk defa yapıldığı için
sizlere bu çalışmada gösterdiğiniz anlayış ve çabadan dolayı bir kere daha teşekkür
ederiz.
Araştırma ile ilgili yukarıda belirtilen hususları okudum ve anladım. Araştır-
maya yönelik tüm sorularım araştırmacı tarafından cevaplandı ve bana bu formun
imzalı bir kopyası verildi. Bu çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katıldım ve iste-
diğim zaman yarıda kesip bırakabileceğimi biliyordum. Verdiğim bilgilerin öğretim
üyesinin master tez çalışmasında ve de bilimsel amaçlı yayınlarında kullanmasını
kabul ediyorum.
KATILIMCI :
ARAŞTIRMACI : CEREN BENGÜ ÇIBIK
Appendix C
Z-TREE SCREENSHOTS
96
Figure 7: The Trust Game - 1
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Figure 8: The Trust Game - 2
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Figure 9: The Transfer Control Game
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Figure 10: The Return Control Game
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Figure 11: The Ultimatum Game - 1
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Figure 12: The Ultimatum Game - 2
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Figure 13: The Offer Control Game
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Figure 14: The Accept Control Game
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Figure 15: The Dictator Game
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